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ABSTRACT
This research examines the current compensation policies of the Republic of Korea
Army with a view toward identifying and recommending the most appropriate compen-
sation policies for recruitment and retention of high quality officers.
The Republic of Korea Army is sustained largely by the loyalty and patriotism of
its members. However, several changes in the economic environment have tended to
make military service a less attractive career alternative for young men. Today, the
ROK Army faces several problems that are relative to inefficient manpower manage-
ment.
Two separate surveys were utilized in an attempt to determine the attitudes of ROK
Army officers relative to compensation policies. The most significant finding of both
surveys is that certain changes in the compensation policies could have a positive influ-
ence on the recruitment and retention of high quality officers. Specific policy changes
that are suggested by the surveys are improvement of pay compensation, focusing on
increasing initial pay of junior officers and a special allowance for typical military job
conditions, and improvement of current promotion and retirement systems for enhanc-
ing job security.
in
C>.l
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 1
A. BACKGROUND 1
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 3
C. RESEARCH METHOD 6
II. COMPENSATION POLICIES 8
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR REWARD SYSTEMS 8
B. PRESENT ROK ARMY COMPENSATION POLICIES FOR OFFI-
CERS 10
1. Pay and Allowances 10
a. Basic Pay 10
b. Basic Allowances 10
c. Special Duty Allowances 12
d. Fringe Benefits 13
2. Personnel Management Policies 14
a. Promotion 14
b. Retirement 15
C. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE CONCERNING MILITARY COM-
PENSATION 17
III. SURVEY RESULTS 22
A. SURVEYS 22
1. Survey Documents 22
2. Population Surveyed 23
3. Limitations and Assumptions 23
B. SURVEY RESULTS 24
1. Results from ROK Army Headquarters Survey 24
a. Background of Respondents 24
b. Military Compensation 26
c. Retirement 28
d. Promotion and Selection 30
IV
e. Other Compensation Packages 32
f. Summary 35
2. Results from NTS Students Questionnaire 37
IV. ANALYSIS 42
A. COMPENSATION POLICIES 42
B. PERSONNEL MANPOWER MANAGEMENT POLICIES 44
1. Promotion and Retirement Systems 45
2. Cost and Effectiveness 47
C. OTHER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICIES 50
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 52
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 52
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 53
APPENDIX A. BASIC PAY MATRIX 55
APPENDIX B. ROK ARMY HEADQUARTERS QUESTIONNAIRE 56
A. BACKGROUND 57
B. GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 57
APPENDIX C. COMPENSATION QUESTIONNAIRE 60
A. BACKGROUND 60
B. MILITARY COMPENSATION 61
C. PROMOTION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 61
D. GENERAL COMPENSATION POLICY 62
APPENDIX D. COMPUTERIZED PROGRAM FOR ANALYSIS (SPSSX) ..63
APPENDIX E. STATISTICS DATA OF SURVEY RESULTS 66
LIST OF REFERENCES 84
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 85
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. COMPARISON OF THE MILITARY FORCE OF SOUTH AND
NORTH KOREA 2
Table 2. MILITARY CAPITAL STOCKS, NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA 5
Table 3. LIST OF ALLOWANCES OF THE ROK ARMY 11
Table 4. PAYMENT RATE OF SEMIANNUAL ALLOWNCE 11
Table 5. COMPOSITION PROPORTION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES- 1 . . 13
Table 6. CONDITIONS OF MANDATORY RETIREMENTS 15
Table 7. COMPARISON OF MILITARY COMPENSATION AND CIVILIAN
EARNINGS 19
Table 8. COMPARISON OF THE INCREASING RATE OF BASE PAY FOR
THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SECTORS, 1975 - 1986 20
Table 9. CROSSTABULATION OF MARITAL STATUS BY PAYGRADE 24
Table 10. CROSSTABULATION OF SERVICE BRANCH BY PAYGRADE . . 25
Table 11. CROSSTABULATION OF PERSONAL ADAPTABILITY TO
MILITARY LIFE BY PAYGRADE 26
Table 12. CROSSTABULATIONS OF SATISFACTION WITH RMC AND
PAY LEVEL BY PAYGRADE 27
Table 13. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH RETIREMENT
SYSTEM BY PAYGRADE 28
Table 14. CROSSTABULATIONS OF RETIREMENT PAY AND CON-
CERNS ABOUT JOB AFTER RETIREMENT BY PAYGRADE . 29
Table 15. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION
BY PAYGRADE 30
Table 16. CROSSTABULATIONS OF SELECTION FOR ADVANCED ED-
UCATION AND SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION BY PAYGRADE 31
Table 17. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH QUARTERS
BY PAYGRADE 32
Table 18. CROSSTABULATIONS OF SATISFACTION WITH REWARDS
AND LEAVE BY PAYGRADE 33
Table 19. CROSSTABULATION OF DISSATISFACTION WITH EX-
VI
TENDED WORK HOURS BY PAYGRADE 34
Table 20. CROSSTABULATION OF ESTIMATES OF COMBAT READ-
INESS BY PAYGRADE 35
Table 21. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY
LIFE AND MILITARY CAREER BY PAYGRADE 36
Table 22. CROSSTABULATION OF SERVICE BRANCH BY PAYGRADE 37
Table 23. FREQUENCY OF REASONS STAYING IN SERVICE 38
Table 24. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH CURRENT
RMC BY PAYGRADE 38
Table 25. CROSSTABULATIONS OF RMC EXPECTATION COMPARING
WITH CIVILIAN COUNTERPART 39
Table 26. CROSSTABULATION OF CHOICE OF EXPECTATION BE-
TWEEN COMPENSATION AND JOB SECURITY BY PAYGRADE 40
Table 27. CROSSTABULATION OF EXPECTATION OF JOB SECURITY
BY PAYGRADE 41
Table 28. FREQUENCY OF OPINIONS FOR RETENTION OF HIGH
QUALITY OFFICERS 41
Table 29. TYPICAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING COSTS OF THE
ACADEMY GRADUATED INFANTRY OFFICER, IN 1987 48
Table 30. CURRENT AVERAGE YEARS OF SERVICE OF ACADEMY
GRADUATES 49
Table 31. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR EXTENTED YEARS OF
SERVICE OF THE ACADEMY GRADUATES 50
Table 32. BASIC PAY MATRIX, 1980 - 1988 55
Vll

I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Personnel management systems for officers have been developed during the 40 years
since the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army was established. In the early 1950s, just after
the Korean Conflict, the young men of an elite group entered the officer corps to dedi-
cate themselves to the national defense of their country, which was divided into the
North and the South. Just after the May 16th Military Revolution, 1 many young men
also joined the Army officer corps mainly to accomplish their ambitions, which meant
that they would like to be a leader of the military or a political group. Today, the ROK
Army faces several problems concerning its personnel management.
Since the 1960s the Republic of Korea has gone through a major economic trans-
formation from an agrarian society to an increasingly urban and industrial society. The
decade between the late 1960s and the late 1970s was a period of rapid economic trans-
formation and growth in Korea. The benefits from this growth spread throughout
Korean society, and family income in both urban and rural Korea rose proportionally.
This change in the economic environment resulted in fewer young men desiring to join
the officer corps.
As the essential institution for National Civic education, the Army has contributed
significantly to the socioeconomic development of Korea during the past several dec-
ades. Most young men, recruited from every corner of the country, have been inten-
sively inculcated to fight not only for the survival of their nation against North Korea's
aggression, but also for their own survival through cooperation and a pioneer spirit.
Overall, the ROK Army, as a school for the nation, has produced approximately eleven
million veterans, trained soldiers, skilled workers, and loyal citizens since it was estab-
lished in 1948. The rapid economic growth of Korea without natural resources was made
possible by those veterans educated in the military organizations. This successful civic
education has been conducted by the officer corps.
1 A eroup of military officers, led by general Park Jung-hee, took over the government on the
16th of May in 1961.
Today, the Korean military force is critical to the deterrence of North Korea's ag-
gression. The military combat power of North Korea is substantially greater than that
of the Korean Armed Force, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. COMPARISON OF THE MILITARY FORCE OF SOUTH AND
NORTH KOREA
Distinction South Korea North Korea
Military Man-
power
Total Active Force 629,000 838,000
Army 542,000 750,000
Navy 54.000 35.000
Air Force 33.000 53.000
Para Military 5. 7 80.000 5.170.000
Army Equipments
Artillery 3,300 6.000
Tank 1.300 2.900
Armed Vehicle 1.050 1.690
Navy Equipments
Submarine 27
Total Naval Vessel 228 566
Air Force Equip-
ments
Fighter & Bomber 476 840
Transport 61 352
* Source : The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance
1987 - 1988", London, IISS, 1988. pp. 162-165.
North Korea persists in its efforts to modernize its large Armed Forces. The force
is approximately 838,000 strong and ranks as the world's fifth-largest military force. The
North Korean military includes 100,000 commandos, the largest commando force in the
world. Nowhere in the world is there an "unconventional warfare" force in such large
numbers as in North Korea. The country, largely isolated and economically poor, has
developed quite a formidable military force. It is an "offensive" force, though untested
in battle.
In terms of overall military capability, South Korea currently is inferior to North
Korea. Moreover, the ROK Army faces deficits of officers in the middle grades. The
officer corps in the Army is divided into the compulsory and long-term service group.
Over 80 percent of junior officers (Lieutenant grades) leave the military after serving
their compulsory period. The rest of them join in the officer corps of the long-term
group.
Military compensation is much lower than civilian earnings. For example, the av-
erage pay of Army officers with seven years of service is 70 or 80 percent of the earnings
of a civilian with the same term of employment in a large company. Moreover, about
50 percent of the captains who are not promoted to higher grade have to leave the mil-
itary before the age of 35, and about 50 percent of the majors leave before their 43rd
birthday. In other words, about 75 percent of the officers in long-term service must
leave the military before the age of 43.
In order to overcome these insufficiencies in military combat power, the Korean
military forces should not only employ new modernized equipment but also employ
more qualified young officers. For the effective enlistment and retention of qualified
officers, the Korean military compensation policy, which includes basic military allow-
ances and job security, should be improved. For this, there is necessity to examine cur-
rent military compensation policy with a view toward identifying and recommending the
most appropriate compensation policies for the ROK Army. This research attempts to
provide a good foundation for improved manpower management in this area.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The compensation package as a whole is a major motivator for prospective volun-
teers. An individual's perception of the compensation package greatly affects the
enlistment and the retention decisions. How much compensation is adequate to attract
and retain qualified personnel is a vital issue for all of the military services.
At present military members are compensated using a system of pay and allowances.
The compensation package of the ROK Army includes basic pay, basic and special al-
lowances, and several fringe benefits. Basic pay is the same for individuals working in
the same paygrade and with the same time in service. However, the utilization of the
remainder of the compensation can vary depending on such factors as paygrade. occu-
pational specialty-rate, marital status, time in service, number of dependents, family
health, duty assignment, and the individual's intentions of making a career of military
service.
Any organization expects to get highly qualified people in order to accomplish its
objectives efficiently. The Army is the largest organization at the scale of people and
budget throughout government or the private sector in Korea. Therefore, the Army
absolutely needs to recruit and retain more highly qualified officers not only to cope with
the deficits of company officers, but also to accomplish its objectives.
There are several research questions concerning the military compensation of the
ROK Army :
• What are the incentives inducing youths to join the officer corps in the ROK
Army ?
• What problems does the ROK Army experience in the retention of lower grade
officers ?
• Is the manpower management of the ROK Army officers efficient ?
• Does the ROK Army offer a steady occupation to the officer ?
A problem related to military compensation could be pointed out from the aspect
of insufficient compensation policy. Basically, the compensation package paid by an
organization takes into consideration the current cost of living, the ability of the organ-
ization to pay, the productivity of the work force, the desirability of full employment,
and the need for an adequate standard of living. The wage level should also be set ac-
cording to the level of difficulty in the job and any job special hazards. [Ref. 1: pp.
62-63.]
During the past several decades, the government compensation policy only focused
on the minimum cost of living and need for a standard living wage, while the private
organization considered all of these factors. However, the Army has more difficult and
hazardous job conditions than those of any civilian job. The conditions of military ser-
vice, such as wartime risks, hazardous missions and trainings, frequent moves, family
separations, DMZ duties, and extended duty hours set it apart from work in the civilian
sector. Nevertheless, military compensation is much lower than civilian earnings.
As mentioned above, most young people today tend to select an occupation that can
guarantee the most income. In addition to the influence of income, factors affecting the
choice of a job or career include individual preferences, prospects for economic growth,
and middle class opportunities. Therefore, it is very difficult to recruit and retain highly
qualified manpower for the officer corps, without the improvement of a compensation
policy.
At the same time, a problem of efficiency in manpower management can be found
in defense resources management. Today, the Republic of Korea invests a large volume
of resources for the national defense, wrhich is estimated at approximately 34 percent of
the national budget or about six percent of the GNP of Korea. Currently, spending on
defense in South Korea is considerably greater than is the case in North Korea, even
though that amount was less than the North, in the past. Total resources allocated to
defense for the period 1976 - 1987 were distinctly larger in South Korea than in North
Korea. However. South Korea's total armed forces are smaller than those of the North
(as shown in Table 1), and its military capital stock is smaller than that of the North,
as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. MILITARY CAPITAL STOCKS, NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
(Billions of dollars), Amount of Defense Budget Appears in Parentheses
Year
North Korea South Korea Comparison
(South/North)
196S 1.998 (.629) .198 (.234) 0.10 (.37)
1969 2.138 (.695) .249 (.285) 0.12 (.41)
1970 2.138 (.746) .328 (.333) 0.13 (.45)
1971 3.111 (.849) .382 (.411) 0.12 (.48)
1972 3.877 (.443) .452 (.428) 0.12 (.96)
19~3 4.189 (.620) .543 (.476) 0.13 (.77)
1974 4.802 (.770) .578 (.558) 0.12 (.72)
1975 4.919 (.878) .653 (.719) 0.13 (.82)
19 76 5.135(1.10) .904(1.52) 0.18 (.15)
1977 5.452(1.03) 1.481 (1.80) 0.27 (1.75)
1978 5.748 (1.20) 2.129 (2.60) 0.37(2.17)
1979 5.776 (1.26) 2.885 (3.22) 0.50 (2.56)
1980 5.968 (1.30) 3.455 (3.46) 0.58 (2.64)
1981 6.038 (1.47) 4.125(4.40) 0.68 (2.99)
1982 5.893 (1.70) 4.703 (3.97) 0.80(2.34)
1983 5.780(1.92) 5.443 (4.41) 0.94(2.19)
* Source : Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Changing Balance : South and North Korean Capa-
bilities for Long-Term Military Competition" (The Rand Corporation, 1985, p.48) and
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance : 1968 - 1988"
(London, IISS).
A Rand Corporation report suggests two possible reasons for the paradox of this
contrast between resources devoted to defense and the resulting military capabilities.
[Ref. 2 : pp. 42 - 50.]
V• First, how real is the paradox (might it be apparent rather than real because of
statistical errors in the estimates) ?
• Second, if the paradox is real, how can it be explained ? And what implications
follow from these comparisons for the long-term military-economic competition
between the South and the North ?
The principal components of the total defense estimates are manpower costs and
military investment. The Rand Corporation estimates assume that the relative per
capita costs of military personnel in the South are approximately four times that of the
North Korean armed forces. [Ref. 2: p. 44.]
Most of the young men of Korea must perform a period of national defense duty in
either an officer or non-officer status. If they want to serve as an officer, they can enter
officer procurement programs such as the academy, ROTC candidates, and several
courses for OCS program. They serve only 30 months for the Army and Marine Corps,
and 36 months for the Navy and Air Force as an enlisted man. The officer from the
ROTC program serves 24 months of compulsory duty, and 36 months in OCS courses
in Korea. On the other hand, young men selected for military duty are at least eighteen
years of age and serve until they are twenty-eight for ten years in North Korea.
Therefore, South Korea has spent four times as much on personnel costs as has the
North, while the North spent more on procurement of military stock. Because the ROK
Army has to recruit and train four soldiers for every one soldier trained in North Korea,
the per capita cost of military7 personnel in North Korea is lower than that of South
Korea. In other words, the ROK Army has to persist in its efforts to reduce spending
on manpower in order to invest more on procurement and operations for the effective-
ness of combat readiness.
C. RESEARCH METHOD
This study is limited to an examination of current compensation policies influencing
retention of officers in the ROK Army. Two separate surveys were utilized in an attempt
to determine the attitudes of ROK Army officers in regard to the area of compensation
under consideration. The first survey was administered in March of 1987 by the ROK
Army Headquarters to gather data concerning the welfare desires of military personnel.
The second survey was undertaken to obtain information in regard to the attitudes of
ROK Army officers studying at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, concerning their
expectations for the future of their military life.
Chapter I of this thesis presents an introduction, including a discussion of ROK
Army compensation, a brief description of the research method, and an outline of the
thesis.
Chapter II explains the compensation policies of the ROK Army in detail, including
requirements for reward systems, describes ROK Army compensation policies, and re-
views the literature concerning military compensation.
Chapter III describes the surveys in detail, including the questionnaire design and
testing, sample selection, and response rate. The results of surveys are then presented.
Chapter IV explains the analysis of the survey results.
Chapter V summarizes the author's conclusions from the analysis, and presents
some recommendations for improving or correcting the problems found and some rec-
ommendations for future research.
II. COMPENSATION POLICIES
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR REWARD SYSTEMS
The purpose of any organization's compensation system is to attract and retain
sufficient numbers of qualified personnel in order to insure the satisfactory completion
of the organization's mission. From the organization's viewpoint, the compensation
level and procedures should be fair to its members but also cost-effective.
[Ref. 3: p. 357.] Optimally, money spent on compensation should be allocated in
such a way as to provide adequate levels of satisfaction for employees at a minimum cost
to the organization.
The satisfaction of individuals with the rewards received in a work situation depends
on many different factors. An individual compares what he or she receives for a task to
the expectation of what should be received. If the individual feels that the reward is too
little, he or she feels dissatisfied and will terminate the employment if there is no prospect
of changing the level of compensation. On the other hand, individuals generally tend to
reevaluate upward the value of their services if their compensation exceeds their expec-
tations. [Ref. 4: p. 164.]
Individuals also compare their compensation to the compensation received by other
workers in similar jobs. This comparison can be made to employees within the same
organization or with other organizations. An individual is satisfied if his or her rewards
are equal or higher than those received by others in similar circumstances.
[Ref. 4: p. 165.]
Any wage structure sets up differentials in pay for employees if one level of em-
ployees is paid more than another level. The question of eq uity is involved in deter-
mining if the differences in pay are felt to be justified by the employees. Is one level
more skilled and proficient in job performance? Does one level of employee have more
responsibility for production than do other levels? For a reward system to be effective,
the employees must judge the resulting pay differentials equitable. [Ref. 5: p. 481.]
Individuals also differ as to what specific rewards or combination of rewards are
preferred or valued as compensation. Satisfaction depends on how closely an individ-
ual's desired form of compensation is met by the organization. [Ref. 4: pp. 165-166.]
Studies have shown, for example, that married men do not desire more time off the
job, while unmarried men do. [Ref. 6: pp. 17-28.] Another study indicated that women
value pay less than do men. Women were found to value work atmosphere more highly
than pay. There is also evidence that emphasis on salary levels decreases as an employee
gets older. [Ref. 7: pp. 47-48.]
The result of differences in desires concerning pay and a general pay policy for all
employees is that money is spent that is not valued by the recipients. Because it is not
valued, money spent will not serve to increase pay satisfaction of the employees at all.
The organization would therefore realize absolutely no return on its investment.
[Ref. 7: p. 253.]
Much has been said about the level of pay satisfaction of employees. Is it really
important that they feel satisfied for effective operations? Pay dissatisfaction in the ci-
vilian sector has been shown to result in strikes, grievances, absenteeism, turnover, and
low job satisfaction. Obviously, strikes would result in large money losses. However,
problems with absenteeism and turnover also result in large financial losses for any or-
ganization. Absenteeism lowers the level of production. Turnover costs an organization
in many ways. Production decreases during the interim between an employee's depar-
ture from a position and a replacement being hired. There are also the hidden costs of
recruitment and training. The new employee also slowly picks up skills over a period
of time before becoming as proficient in performance as the previous employee who had
been on the job for a lengthy period of time. [Ref. 7: p. 249.]
If pay satisfaction levels are important, what should an organization do to raise
what is perceived to be low levels of pay satisfaction? An obvious answer would be to
give everyone an across-the-board salary increase as much as giving satisfaction to the
employees. This would definitely increase not only the organization's satisfaction level
but also the personnel cost of the organization.
Another significant element of requirements for reward systems is the job security
that could make employees feel their job a lifetime employment, because job security
gives employees freedom from anxiety concerning future employment. Some research
coupled with case-report evidence suggests that improvements in the work climate and
structure frequently lead to greater productivity as well as to greater job satisfaction.
[Ref. 8: p. 229.]
Quality of working life research is concerned with how the relationship between in-
dividuals and features of their physical, social, and economic work environment affects
those society considers to be important. One of the important elements to enhance the
quality of working life is affording opportunities for continued growth ; that is, oppor-
tunities to advance in organizational or career terms. [Ref. 8: pp. 3-4.]
The high turnover rate of employees well trained would be not only increasing their
initial training costs but also decreasing the motivation and productivity of an organ-
ization. Lifetime employment makes it possible to dismiss personnel just because their
task has been redundant.
B. PRESENT ROK ARMY COMPENSATION POLICIES FOR OFFICERS
This section outlines current ROK Army compensation policies for officers. Spe-
cifically, policies of pay and allowances and some personnel management policies con-
cerning promotion and retirement are discussed.
1. Pay and Allowances
a. Basic Pay
Basic pay is the same for individuals working in the same specialty in the
same paygrade and with the same time in service. However, basic allowances and special
duty allowances can vary depending on such factors as paygrade, occupational
specialty-rate, marital status, time in service, number of dependents, duty assignment,
and intentions of making a career of military service.
b. Basic Allowances
Table 3 shows the list of basic and special allowances of the ROK Army.
The basic allowances are quarter bonuses and semiannual allowances, subsistence al-
lowance, basic allowance for quarters, family subsidy, continuation allowance, and al-
lowance for social activity.
(1) Quarter Bonuses. All active officers receive quarter bonuses four
times per year at the end of each quarter. The amount of this bonus is calculated as
follows: Quarter Bonus = (L Basic Pay paid at the end of every fiscal Quarter) '3
(2) Semiannual Allowance. All active duty officers also receive semi-
annual allowance two times per year, once in January and once in July. Table 4 shows
that the amount of this allowance increases by an officer's years of service. This allow-
ance is one of the incentive allowances that are inducing the junior officer to remain in
long-term service.
10
Table 3. LIST OF ALLOWANCES OF THE ROK ARMY
Basic Allowances Special Allowances
• Quarter Bonus
• Semiannual Allowance
• Subsistence Allowance
• Basic Allowance for Quarters
• Family Subsidy
• Continuation Allowance
• Allowance for Social Activity
• Technical Allowance
• Allowance for Hazards
• Allowance for DMZ Duty
• Flight Duty Allowance
• Allowance for Legal, Religion,
Medical
• Allowance for Instructor
* Source : Adapted from the ROK Army Regulation 026-3, "Pay and Allowances",
pp. 4 -35.
Table 4. PAYMENT RATE OF SEMIANNUAL ALLOWNCE
Years of
Service
Base of Payment Rate Years of
Service
Base of Payment Rate
- 1 50% of Base Pay 1 - 2 55% of Base Pay
2 - 3 60% of Base Pay 3 - 4 65% of Base Pay
4 - 5 70% of Base Pay 5 - 6 75% of Base Pay
6 - 7 80% of Base Pay 7 - 8 85% of Base Pay
8 - 9 90% of Base Pay 9 - 10 95% of Base Pay
10 - 100% of Base Pay-
* Source : Adapted from the ROK Army Regulation 026-3. "Pay and Allowances",
p. 31.
C3) Subsistence Allowance. The subsistence allowance is intended to
provide for the food cost of each officer. All officers are paid the same amount of the
allowance without considering paygrade and other factors. The officer in compulsory
service also receives this allowance. The officer can receive this allowance in the form
of a cash allowance or actual meals by military food preparation facilities. Officers
11
usually receive the allowance in cash, though some prefer to have meals at the military
mess hall.
(4) Basic Allowance for Quarters. The basic allowance for quarters is
intended to provide for the housing needs of the officer in long-term service. The junior
officer (Lieutenant Paygrade) in compulsory or long-term service is not paid an allow-
ance for quarters. Like the subsistence allowance, the quarters allowance can be re-
ceived in the form of cash or actual government quarters. The cash basic allowance for
quarters is the same for all officers without considering paygrade, years of service, and
residental areas. Personal experience suggests that the rental value of housing in the
middle urban cities may be worth four or five times more than that of rural areas.
(5) Other Basic Allowances. Family subsidy is intended to provide for
the food cost of officer's dependents (limited to his or her spouse and only two children).
This allowance can vary depending on only the number of dependents without consid-
ering paygrade. Continuation allowance is one of the incentive allowances that are in-
ducing compulsory officers to retain to the long-term service. Thus, it can vary
depending on only years of service. Allowance for social activity is paid for officer's
social activity including his or her activity to stimulate morale of his or her unit mem-
bers. This allowance can vary depending on only paygrade. Most of these allowances
are provided only to the officers in long-term service.
As shown in Table 5, as paygrade goes up, the proportion of base pay is getting
lower and the proportion of allowance for social activity is getting higher. The pro-
portions of others are not significant as the paygrade goes up. The average proportion
of base pay to the compensation package is 63.3 percent. Thus, base pay is the primary
factor of military compensation. It seems that the differential of compensation between
the officers of long-term service and compulsory service does not exist. In other words,
the compensation policy could not give the officers in compulsory service any incentive
to be able to join the officer corps of long-term service. Therefore, the junior officer in
required service would not want to remain in the Army beyond the required period.
c. Special Duty Allowances
Special allowances are composed of technical allowance, allowance for
hazardous duty, flight duty allowance, allowance for instructor, allowance for
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) duty, and allowance for medical, legal, and religious duty.
These allowances are paid to the officers who are assigned to the special duty. However,
allowance for DMZ duty is paid only to enlisted personnel.
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Table 5. COMPOSITION PROPORTION OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES- 1
Paygrade Ol 02 03 04 05 06 Average
Years of Service 1 2 5 9 13 18
Base Pay .675 .695 .619 .594 .601 .615 .633
Social Activity Allowance .125 .117 .173 .210 .225 .226 .179
Subsistence Allowance — 2 .128 .120 .078 .058 .048 .041 .079
Continuation Allowance .072 .068 .065 .065 .066 .068 .067
Family Subsidy* . . .065 .073 .060 .051 .042
—
' Among the basic allowances, quarter bonus, semiannual allowance and basic allow-
ance for quarters were not considered.
— 2 The cash amount of subsistence allowance is same for all grades of the officer corps.
—
3 Ol and 02 were considered as unmarried, 03 was considered with a spouse and a
child, the officers above 04 were considered with a spouse and two children.
* Source : Calculated from the "Base Pay Chart and Allowances Standard Table in
1988" of the ROK Army, pp. 27 - 75.
d. Fringe Benefits
A variety of nonpecuniary allowances that are provided to officers represent
a significant benefit to them. It is rather difficult to determine the exact cash value of
these benefits because of the many variables involved.
(1) Retirement Benefits. The retirement program is probably the most
valuable benefit provided to military personnel. After serving twenty years of active
service, retirement pay amounting to 50 percent of the individual's terminal base pay is
provided. Those personnel serving beyond twenty years receive increases at the rate of
two percent per year up to a maximum of 70 percent at thirty years. The program is
funded half by the individual, and the other half by government. Thus, service personnel
make a direct contribution to their retirement. However, the personnel serving below
twenty years receive only lump-sum retirement pay cumulated by his or her contribution
during his or her active service years.
(2) Medical Care. All active military personnel are provided unlimited
health care. However, it is not provided to military dependents. Instead, the govern-
ment pays the 50 percent of medical insurance premium for military dependents. Mili-
tary personnel must pay another 50 percent of that for his or her dependent's health
care.
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(3) Benefit for Children's Education. This program also provides a
valuable benefit to military personnel. Currently, most of the parents whose children
go to the middle or high school have to pay tuition fees to the school for their children's
schooling in Korea. The government pays the tuition fees to the school instead of mili-
tary personnel with children being at the middle or high school. The government also
provides low-interested loans to military personnel who want to borrow some money for
their children's college education.
(4) Others. There are other fringe benefits that have been provided by
the ROK Army. Examples of these benefits are the utilization of military free-tax home
appliance exchanges and military resort facilities.
2. Personnel Management Policies
This subsection outlines current ROK Army personnel management policies
concerning promotion and retirement, focusing on the recruiting and retention of offi-
cers.
a. Promotion
ROK Army Regulation 110-16 establishes minimum time in grade (TIG)
requirements for an officer to be considered for promotion or promoted to the next
higher grade. Minimum time in grade requirements is as follows :
( 1
)
2LT and 1 LT. No minimum TIG requirements for consideration
for promotion ; however, the officers must serve 12 months and 36 months TIG prior
to being promoted to 1LT and Captain, respectively.
(2) Captain through Colonel. An officer in any paygrade of Captain
through Colonel must serve 4 years TIG prior to being considered for promotion, re-
spectively.
In comparison with policies of U. S. Army, the minimum TIG requirements
of the ROK Army are very short. Faster promotion results in faster retirement, with the
exception of those who will be able to reach the level of flag officer. In other words, the
promotion system of the ROK Army was established completely for the structure of the
military rather than as a reward for the employees. Minimum TIG requirements were
set up by those who could remain in the military from a junior officer through a full
general. However, the average service period of the ROK Army officers in long-term
service has been 15 years. Thus, many officers have to leave the military before their
39th birthday. This short term of military service causes the junior officers to avoid
service beyond their compulsory requirements.
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b. Retirement
Since mandatory retirement is required by law, it must be accomplished on
the date established by the applicable statute, regardless of the desire of the oflicer con-
cerned. An individual may request retirement and be retired voluntarily on his manda-
tor}' retirement date. Table 6 shows that there are three different mandatory retirements.
Table 6. CONDITIONS OF MANDATORY RETIREMENTS
CPT MAJ LTC COL
Service in Grade 8 8 8 9
Years of Service 14 20 24 27
Maximum Age 43 43 47 50
* Source : Adapted from the ROK Army Regulation 110-3, "Officer Personnel ; Sep-
arations", 19S4.
(1) Captain. Each officer of the ROK Army who holds the regular
grade of Captain, who is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the
regular grade of Major, shall, if not earlier retired, be retired on the earliest of the fol-
lowing dates :
• The last day of the first month beginning after the date of the eighth anniversary
of his appointment to that grade, or
• The last day of the month after the month in which he completes 14 years of active
commissioned service, or
• The last day of the month following the month in which he becomes 43 years of
age.
(2) Major. Each officer of the ROK Army who holds the regular grade
of Major, who is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the regular
grade of LT Colonel, shall, if not earlier retired, be retired on the earliest of the following
dates :
• The last day of the first month beginning after the date of the eighth anniversary
of his appointment to that grade, or
• The last day of the month after the month in which he completes 20 years of active
commissioned service, or
• The last day of the month following the month in which he becomes 43 years of
age.
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(3) LT Colonel. Each officer of the ROK Army who holds the regular
grade of LT Colonel, who is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the
regular grade of Colonel, shall, if not earlier retired, be retired on the earliest of the fol-
lowing dates :
• The last day of the first month beginning after the date of the eighth anniversary
of his appointment to that grade, or
• The last day of the month after the month in which he completes 24 years of active
commissioned service, or
• The last day of the month following the month in which he becomes 47 years of
age.
(4) Colonel. Each officer of the ROK Army who holds the regular
grade of Colonel, who is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion to the
regular grade of BG General, shall, if not earlier retired, be retired on the earliest of the
following dates :
• The last day of the first month beginning after the date of the ninth anniversary
of his appointment to that grade, or
•
•
The last day of the month after the month in which he completes 27 years of active
commissioned service, or
The last day of the month following the month in which he becomes 50 years of
aee.
A significant finding concerned with the retirement regulation is that the
ROK Army intends to acquire more young officers. The conditions of mandator}' re-
tirement require that the officer should be retired at the earliest date as indicated by the
regulation. It is in contrast to the U. S. Army regulation which requires an officer's re-
tirement on the later of the dates. The requirement of retirement is the opposite of the
officer's willingness. Most officers serving under the national conscription system are
willing to remain in the military as long as they can.
Generally, the younger officer is more efficient at the combat level, partic-
ularly at the grade of company officer (i. e., infantry tactics). However, there is no evi-
dence or study concerning the effect of combat power associated with the physical
strength of younger officers. Obviously, at the higher officer levels of the military, older
officers could be more efficient in performing the mission than the younger officers.
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C. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE CONCERNING MILITARY
COMPENSATION
There are few studies concerning the military compensation policies of the ROK
Army. Moreover, almost all statistical data on the ROK Army are classified. However,
some useful information and insights can be obtained from studies of compensation
policies and practices of the U. S. military.
The major factors in all studies of military compensation were visibility and equity.
The visibility issue is concerned with the ability to compare accurately military com-
pensation levels with civilian pay levels. The equity issue is primarily concerned with the
differences in military compensation between compulsory duty personnel and long-term
service personnel.
The military and the civilian sector differ in the way they view compensation. Pri-
marily, military compensation is based on paygrade and years of service. Occupational
differences are taken into account only through special duty allowances for those jobs
in which hazards and specialty conditions exist. On the other hand, civilian compen-
sation is more likely to be based on the labor market where labor demand and supply
for an occupation are more important determinants of the amount of compensation that
a particular occupation will receive at any given time. [Ref. 9: p. 2.]
Second, the cost of living also differs between the military and civilian sectors.
These costs are affected by geographical location, population, tax policies, and the wel-
fare benefits of an organization. Moreover, there are significant differences between the
military and civilian occupations concerning the mission and productivity. Military
service often involves hazardous duty, job risk, family hardship, and other personal de-
mands that are not normally found in civilian employment.
•^ The one sure portion of military compensation that can be accurately compared to
civilian pay is base pay. The value of housing and subsistence allowances issued in-kind
is very difficult to judge. Service members seldom have a good idea of the fair market
value of government-provided housing and meals, because most civilian firms also pro-
vide a comprehensive medical care package and housing plans for their employees. The
other fringe benefits are even more difficult to measure as far as actual monetary value.
Any decision on military pay levels based on a comparison with civilian jobs would
have to take into account some sort of differential for the working conditions of military
jobs as opposed to the typical civilian job. Military employment involves non-payment
of overtime, strict discipline, transfers, and hazards to the life of the service member.
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These aspects are not common to many civilian jobs. Therefore, a special compensation
policy that can compensate for the typical military job should be considered. Even
though there are some special allowances for special job conditions, such as allowance
for hazards (i. e., for the officers in airborne units) and flight duty allowance (i. e., for
helicopter pilots), these do not represent special compensation for the typical military
characteristics. The infantry officers of the ROK Army are the main component of the
officer group, accounting for over 60 percent of total officers. They are assigned to
DMZ duty during one-third of their military service period. During DMZ duty, they can
stay with their families off base just for one night per week or month. For the rest of
the time, they have to remain on base.
In addition to DMZ duty, they have to transfer to a new base every 2 or 3 years.
This constant moving disrupts their social relations and development, and it can also
have an adverse effect on their children's education and family's economic security.
[Ref. 10: pp. 47-56.]
Table 7 compares levels of compensation between military personnel and their ci-
vilian counterparts with the same number of year in government-run firms and private
companies. However, as shown in Table 7, the regular military compensation (RMC)
of junior officers (LT) is less than 60-percent of the average earnings of civilians. The
RMC for middle grade officers (CPT and MAJ) is also below 80 percent of civilian
earnings. This may explain why junior officers and youth people are reluctant to join
the officer corps of long-term service or officer programs such as academy and OCS
programs.
A study by the Department of Accounting Management of the ROK Army in 1986
revealed a consistent underestimation of total military compensation by the officer
corps. Approximately 49 percent of all officers surveyed underestimated their total
RMC. RMC involves only base pay, quarter bonus and semiannual allowance, and
continuation allowance. The basic reasons of the underestimation might be explained
by two aspects. Initial basic pay of officer personnel (i. e., 2 LT's base pay) is set up too
much below that of the civilian sector. The beginning pay of a 2LT was just 54.8 percent
of his counterpart who was employed by a government-run firm and 59.3 percent of the
average person working at a business company.
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Table 7. COMPARISON OF MILITARY COMPENSATION AND CIVILIAN
EARNINGS - 1
( Unit : WON -')
Paygrade of
Mil Civ (Years
of Service)
Military
Pay (A)
Govern-
ment - run
Firms (B)
Private
Companies
(C)
Comparison (%)
• (A/B)/(A/C)
2 LT Employee
(1 yr)
247,800 452,050 417,800 54.8 / 59.3
1 LT / Employee
(3 yrs)
287,800 559,500 521,100 51.4/ 55.2
CPT Section
Leader (5 yrs)
529,800 699,360 754,600 75.7 / 70.2
MAJ Section
Chief (9 yrs)
700,000 906,500 953,200 77.2 / 73.4
LT COL / Asst.
Director (13 yrs)
947,500 1,112.380 1,197,400 85.2 / 79.1
COL
,
Director
(18 yrs)
1,115.200 1,332,400 1,422,600 83.7 / 78.4
Average 638,800 843,700 877,780 75.6 72.7
—'Regular Militan - Compensation (RMC) involves only base pay, quarter bonus,
semiannual allowances, and continuation allowances. Civilian earnings is also estimated
by similar categories of the military.
—
2Won is a monetary unit in the Republic of Korea.
^ * Source : HQ of the ROK Army, "Military Compensation Review in 1986", 1987.
The second reason is that increasing the rates of base pay for officer personnel had
been lower than those of the civilian sector. Table 8 shows average increasing rates of
base pay between the civilian and military sectors during the last decade. The average
increasing rate of military pay was 11.1 percent, while that of the civilian sectors was
15.9 percent. In addition to the lower initial pay level of the military, increasing rates
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also were lower than in civilian business. Therefore, the officers surveyed tend to
underestimate their regular compensation. The end result of the prevalent miscon-
ception of military compensation levels is that money is expended for no benefit to the
government. Compensation that is not recognized as such is an inefficient and ineffec-
tive way to satisfy military personnel's pay desires.
Table 8. COMPARISON OF THE INCREASING RATE OF BASE PAY FOR
THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SECTORS, 1975 - 1986
(%)
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Average
Average of
Civilian
29.5 23.4 21.3 15.8 11.0 8.7 9.2 8.2 15.9
Average of
Military
28.2 9.7 10.2 7.7 25.1 1 2.1 5.5 11.1
2 LT 25.0 9.9 10.0 5.0 36.5 1 3.5 5.9 12.0
1 LT 25.0 9.9 10.0 9.0 29.8 1 3.0 5.9 11.6
CPT 28.2 9.9 9.8 11.3 29.5 1 2.1 5.9 12.1
MAJ 28.1 10.1 13.3 7.9 23.2 1 1.7 5.9 11.3
LTCol 34.8 10.1 11.0 7.0 18.5 1 1.3 4.6 10.9
COL 27.9 8.0 7.1 6.0 12.8 1 1.1 4.8 8.5
—
' Government budget of FY 1984 for the base pay of all officers was frozen.
* Source : Compiled data from the pay charts of FY 1975 through FY* 1986 of the ROK
Army that is attached as Appendix A.
The equity issue is concerned primarily with the perception that military pay is not
closely tied to job performance. Equity calls for pay to be equal for all jobs of similar
skill requirements and to increase as a member advances to more responsible senior po-
sitions.
Another issue would involve the establishment of cost for government-provided fa-
cilities such as housing and meals. The fair market value of the facilities would have to
be established. The study found the value of family government quarters to be greater
than the cash value of BAQ in general. It was estimated that family quarters are occu-
pied by more senior officers. An ROK Army report at the end of 1987 shows that ap-
proximately 68 percent of the officer corps live in government quarters. Relatively
junior officers have to live in civilian housing. Overall, the cash value received by a
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non-resident in government quarters is less than one-third of the value of government
quarters.
Most of the military compensation studies noted that there has been insufficient
flexibility to cope with changes in the civilian employment market. This lack of flexi-
bility has led to poor retention in many rates. Most of the studies have also recom-
mended the retention of special pay and bonuses to provide some measure of flexibility
in rates where normal military compensation has not been sufficient to retain adequate
numbers of highly qualified personnel.
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III. SURVEY RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the survey, including the questionnaire
design and testing, sample selection, population surveyed, and the results of the survey.
The survey was utilized to collect information that could support policy formation and
research, necessary for dealing with present and future Korean military compensation
issues. The data include information about the behavior, attitudes, preferences, and in-
tentions of military personnel. The data also assess the response of officers to current
compensation policies including promotion and retirement systems, and identify possible
areas for future compensation policy changes.
A. SURVEYS
1. Survey Documents
Two separate surveys were utilized in an attempt to determine the attitudes of
ROK Army officer personnel relative to the areas of compensation under consideration.
The first survey was administered in March of 1987 by the ROK Army Headquarters to
estimate the welfare desire status of service personnel in the Army. The second survey
was of Korean students at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School and was used to collect
data concerning attitudes toward compensation, promotion and retirement policies for
the retention of officers.
ROK Army Headquarters' survey was titled the "Survey Questionnaire On
Welfare Desire of Officer Personnel" and is attached as Appendix B. This survey was
intended to be administered to the active duty service personnel in the Army during
March 1987. The survey could be divided into two basic parts. The first section gath-
ered personal information on each respondent by paygrade, age, years of service, com-
missioned source, and marital status.
The second section was intended for gathering information concerning military
personnel welfare desire status. The personnel management policy questions included
compensation, promotion, rewards, evaluation, selection, retirement system and benefits,
government quarters, medical care, leave, PX utilization, satisfaction with military life,
the condition of family life, job attitudes, and fringe benefits. Each respondent was re-
quired to answer every question by selecting one of five responses that represent per-
sonal attitudes such as very satisfied, satisfied, normal, dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied.
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The second survey was expected to gather data relative to the attitudes of ROK
Army officers in order to supplement the ROK Army Headquarters Survey. This survey
was completed by Korean students studying at the Naval Postgraduate School. The
survey was titled "Compensation Questionnaire" and is attached as Appendix C.
This survey could be divided into four categories. The first category was con-
cerned with personal data such as, present paygrade, marital status, branch, years of
service, and reasons for staying in the service. The second one concerned military com-
pensation policies compared with civilian sectors. The third one concerned promotion
and retirement policies. The fmal one addressed general compensation issues regarding
the entire military compensation system. Members could also express their views con-
cerning additional problem areas.
2. Population Surveyed
ROK Army Headquarters Questionnaire was administered service-wide. Even-
tually, 7343 surveys were completed and returned to Army Headquarters for evaluation.
The sample of 862 officer personnel respondents was chosen from 905 completed ques-
tionnaires that had been selected by Army Headquarters and sent to the author. Initial
selection criteria was paygrade distribution. The remaining 43 questionnaires were not
used in the analysis, because the sincerity of their answers was doubtful. To permit the
evaluation of the respondent's sincerity, the questionnaire was composed of several
similar questions, so that checks could be made between answers to similar questions.
As a result of this procedure, S62 samples were selected.
The second survey. "Compensation Questionnaire", was administered to 30
Korean students at the Naval Postgraduate School. The object of the survey, terminol-
ogy, and how to complete the survey was personally explained to each respondent prior
to completing the survey. Respondents' replies were based on what they thought was
the best answer to each question. This survey was conducted on 1 March through 30
March of 1988. Questions were extracted from the "1985 DOD Survey", administered
by the Defense Manpower Data Center, and modified for Korean students.
3. Limitations and Assumptions
There were some limitations and assumptions in administering the second sur-
vey. Survey questions were designed with the assumption that constructive changes in
Korean military compensation, promotion, and retirements policies can help to over-
come problems of recruiting and the retention of high quality people. In administering
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the second survey, the assumption was made that the respondent's duty station and
housing ware based on their last station in Korea.
B. SURVEY RESULTS
SPSSX was utilized to compile the results of the survey in tables. The computerized
program for analysis of the questionnaires is attached as Appendix D. The results of
certain questions from each survey are provided in this section. The results of remaining
questions are attached as Appendix E. Data provided by respondents are presented,
discussed and compared. However, the emphasis of this section is purposely limited to
a presentation of the complied data without the possible inferences that could be drawn
from such information.
1. Results from ROK Army Headquarters Survey
a. Background of Respondents
Respondents were grouped basically by paygrade. Table 9 indicates the
distribution of respondents by paygrade and marital status. Overall, there were 566
married respondents and 296 bachelor respondents to the survey. All respondents above
Major, 21.6 percent of the Captains, 7.9 percent of the 2 LTs, and only 5.7 percent of
the 1 LTs were married.
Table 9. CROSSTABULATION OF MARITAL STATUS BY PAYGRADE
PAYGRADE
COUNT I
I 2ND LT 1ST LT CAPTAIN MAJOR LT COL COL ROW
I TOTAL
MARITAL 11 12 13 14 15 16 I
STATUS .+ + _+ + + + -+
I 82 I 139 I 75 I 01 01 I 296
SINGLE I I
I 5 I 12
I I I I
I 272 I 176 I 83 I 18
I
-+
I
34.3
566
MARRIED I I
M 87 151
I I I I
347 176 83 18
I
-+
65.7
C0LUM1 862
TOTAL 10.1 17.5 40.3 20.4 9.6 2.1 100.0
Table 10 gives a breakdown of respondents by paygrade and service branch.
The distribution of respondents by service branch is representative of the actual pro-
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portions of each branch within the ROK Army. Infantry is the largest branch of the
service in the Table, as it is in the actual composition of the Army. The second largest
is the Artillery, which is only one-fourth as large as the Infantry.
Table 10. CROSSTABULATION OF SERVICE BRANCH BY PAYGRADE
BRANCH
COUNT I
I INFANTRY ARTILLER ARMOR ENGINEER COMMUNI OTHERS ROW
I Y CATION TOTAL
11 12 13 14 15 16 I
PAYGRADE
I 67 I 6 I 2 I 8 I 4 I I 87
2ND LT I I I I I I I 10. 1
I 102 I 24 I 3 I 9 I 6 I 8 I 151
1ST LT I I I I I I I 17.5
I 188 I 58 I 3 I 22 I 43 I 33 I 347
CAPTAIN I I I I I I I 40. 3
I 83 I 22 I 5 I 44 I 11 I 11 I 176
MAJOR I I I I I I I 20.4
I 51 I 21 I 2 I 4 I 3 I 2 I 83
LT COL I
+-
I
I
I
1 1
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+
I
9.6
12 4 1 1 18
COL I
+-
I I I I
-+-
I
-+-
I
-+
2. 1
COLUMN 503 135 15 88 68 53 862
TOTAL 58.4 15. 7 1 . 7 10. 2 7.9 6.2 100.
Table 11 displays the distribution of responses concerning each individual's
personal adaptability to military life. Almost all the officers surveyed indicated that their
adaptability to military life was proper, except 8.4 percent of officers who judged it as
unsuitable. Table 1 1 shows that the lower the paygrade of respondents, the lower the
degree of personal adaptability to military life.
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Table 11. CROSSTABULATION OF PERSONAL ADAPTABILITY TO
MILITARY LIFE BY PAYGRADE
PERSONAL ADAPTABILITY TO MILITARY LIFE
COUNT I
I VERY HIGH NORMAL LOW ROW
I HIGH TOTAL
PAYGRADE -+ + + + +
I 17 I 19 I 31 I 20 I 87
2ND LT I I I I I
+ + -+-- + +
I 10 I 51 I 72 I 18 I
10. 1
151
1ST LT I I I I I
I 85 I 99 I 136 I 27 I
17.5
347
CAPTAIN I I I I I
+ + + + +
I 43 I 75 I 53 I 5 1
40. 3
176
MAJOR I I I I I
+ + + + +
I 34 I 36 I 11 I 2 1
20.4
83
LT COL I I I I I
I 31 61 91 01
9.6
18
COLONEL I I I I I
192 286 312 72
2. 1
COLUMN 862
TOTAL 22.3 33.2 36.2 8.4 100.0
b. Military Compensation
Table 12 indicates the distribution of respondents concerning satisfaction
with regular military compensation and satisfaction with pay levels of each paygrade as
compared with civilian sectors. Over 63 percent of all officer respondents indicated that
they were not satisfied with their RMC. 54.5 percent of the field grade officers, and 67
percent of the company grade officers were dissatisfied with their RMC. It is interesting
to note that the company grade officers have more dissatisfaction with RMC than the
field grade officers.
In comparing pay levels with the civilian sector, 594 members (68.9 percent
of the group) indicated that they were dissatisfied with their pay level when compared
with civilians of the same age. Table 12 indicates that a high proportion of middle grade
officers were dissatisfied. It could be explained that their cost of living was relatively
lareer than the others.
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Table 12. CROSSTABULATIONS OF SATISFACTION WITH RMC AND
PAY LEVEL BY PAYGRADE
SATISFACTION WITH RMC
COUNT I
ISATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
ID FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
PAYGRADE
1 I I 33 I 37 I 17 I 87
2ND LT I I I I I 10. 1
2 I 18 I 36 I 62 I 35 I 151
1ST LT I I I I I 17.5
3 I 16 I 90 I 180 I 61 I 347
CAPTAIN I I I I I 40.3
4 I 21 I 56 I 67 I 32 I 176
MAJOR I I I I I 20.4
5 I 15 I 18 I 47 I 3 I 83
LT COLONEL I I I I I 9.6
6 I 9 I 7 I 2 I I 18
COLONEL I
+ --
I I I I
-+
2. 1
COLUMN 79 240 395 148 862
TOTAL 9.2 27. 8 45. 8 17.2 LOO.
SATISFACTION WITH PAY LEVEL COMPARED WITH CIVILIAN
COUNT
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
PAYGRADE - + _+ -+ _+__. _+__. -+
I I I 52 I 35 I 87
2ND LT I
+
I
I
-+
I
I
I
I
I
-+--
I 10. 1
-+
I 15136 83 32
1ST LT I
+
I
I
_+
I
I
I
I
I
_+__.
I 17.5
--+
I 3476 28 54 189 70
CAPTAIN I
+
I
I
-+
I
I
I
I
I
_+__.
I 40. 3
-+
I 17643 12 64 57
MAJOR I I I I I 20.4
+ -+ _+ _+__. -+--- --+
I I 7 I 17 I 59 I 83
LT COL I I I I I 9.6
I I 1 I 12 I 5 I 18
COLONEL I I I I I 2. 1
COLUMN 6 79 183 435 159 862
TOTAL . 7 9. 2 21. 2 50.5 18.4 100.
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c. Retirement
Table 13 indicates the distribution of respondents relative to the retirement
systems of the ROK Army by paygrade. There were 45.8 percent of the total who judged
the current retirement system as unsuitable (indicating very dissatisfied or dissatisfied).
Officer personnel above the middle grades (i. e., CPT through COL) tend to have more
dissatisfaction with the retirement system, while junior officers, probably in compulsory
service, do not have so much.
As shown in the first one of the Table 14, there were about 39 percent of
the total who judged the retirement benefits of the Army as dissatisfied. They were not
satisfied with retirement benefits including an annuity pension and lump-sum retirement
pay. The lower the officers's paygrade, the greater was the proportion of the group
concerning the dissatisfaction with retirement pay.
About 46.4 percent of the total who was highly concerned with jobs after
retirement, and only 27 percent of the respondents not concerned were under the
paygrade of Major.
Table 13. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH RETIREMENT
SYSTEM BY PAYGRADE
PAYGRADE
2ND LT
1ST LT
CAPTAIN
MAJOR
LT COL
COLONEL
SATISFACTION WITH RETIREMENT SYSTEM
COUNT I
IVERY DIS DISSATIS
ISATISFIE FIED
--+
COLUMN
TOTAL
.+__.
NORMAL SATISFIE VERY SAT ROW
D ISFIED TOTAL
+ + ++ +
1 I
I
I
I
18 I
I
33 I
I
16
+ +
96 I
I
36 I
I
12 I
I
125
I
I
+-
I
I
+-
I
I
+-
I
I
+-
I
I
+ + + + +
I
I
46 I
I
19 I
I
6 I
I
+ + + +-
147
17. 1
247
28. 7
51 I
I
101 I
I
+
94 I
I
74 I
I
37 I
I
-
9 I
I
366
42.5
I
I
+-•
I
I
+-•
I
I
+-•
I
I
+-
I
I
1 I
I
+
98
11.4
17
29
20
15
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
+
I
I
+
I
I
+
I
I
+
87
10. 1
151
17.5
347
40. 3
176
20.4
83
9. 6
18
2. 1
862
100.0
28
Table 14. CROSSTABULATIONS OF RETIREMENT PAY AND CON-
CERNS ABOUT JOB AFTER RETIREMENT BY PAYGRADE
RETIREMENT PAY
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
I 5 I 12 I 23 I 26 I 21 I 87
2ND LT I I I I I I 10. 1
I 7 I 23 I 62 I 45 I 14 I 151
1ST LT I I I I I I 17.5
I 47 I 73 I 106 I 87 I 34 I 347
CAPTAIN I I I I I I 40. 3
I 3 I 19 I 77 I 72 I 5 I 176
MAJOR I I I I I I 20.4
I I 8 I 48 I 18 I 9 I 83
LT COL I
+ -
I
-+-
I
-+-
I
-+-
I
-+-
I
-+
9.6
I 1 I 3 I 9 I 5 I I 18
COLONEL I
+-
I I
-+-
I
-+-
I
-+-
I
-+
2. 1
COLUMN 63 138 325 253 83 862
TOTAL 7. 3 16.0 37. 7 29.4 9. 6 100.
CONCERN ABOUT JOB AFTER RETIREMENT
COUNT I
I VERY HI NORMAL LOW VERY ROW
I HIGH LOW TOTAL
PAYGRADE --- -+- -+- -+- -+- -+- -+
I 17 I 19 I 36 I 15 I I 87
2ND LT I
+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+
I
10. 1
54 31 21 18 27 151
1ST LT I
+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+
I
17.5
100 67 71 70 39 347
CAPTAIN I
+ -
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+
I
40. 3
11 23 78 43 21 176
MAJOR I I I I I I 20.4
I 43 I 19 I 21 I I I 83
LT COL I I I I I I 9.6
I 10 I 6 I 2 I I I 18
COLONEL I I I I I I 2. 1
COLUMN 235 165 229 146 87 862
TOTAL 27. 3 19. 1 26.6 16.9 10. 1 100.
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d. Promotion and Selection
Table 15 displays the distribution of respondents by paygrade concerning
satisfaction with promotion opportunity. About 49.4 percent of the total was dissatis-
fied with promotion opportunity. As shown in Table 15, officer personnel in middle
grades (CPT through LT COL) have higher dissatisfaction with promotion results.
Table 16 showTs the distributions of respondents concerning selections for
advanced educations and performance evaluations for officer personnel. Table 16 indi-
cates that there were a few officers dissatisfied, about 12.1 percent for selection and 18.7
percent for performance evaluation. The paygrades of Major and Captain tend to have
higher proportions of dissatisfaction with both cases, possibly because they have greater
concern with selection and evaluation relative to promotion.
Table 15. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION
BY PAYGRADE
SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
PAYGRADE .4- 4. 4. 4. 4. 4.
I 9 1 10 I 37 I 31 I 1 87
2ND LT I I I I I I
4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4.
I 16 I 21 I 97 I 17 I 1
10. 1
151
1ST LT I I I I I I
I 1 23 I 54 I 172 I 98 I
17.5
347
CAPTAIN I I I I I I
I 6 1 30 I 87 I 48 I 5 1
40. 3
176
MAJOR I I I I I I
I 3 1 10 I 17 I 29 I 24 I
20.4
83
LT COL I I I I I I
I 01 51 11 I 21 01
9.6
18
COLONEL I I I I I I
+ + + + + +
34 99 303 299 127
2. 1
COLUMN 862
TOTAL 3.9 11.5 35.2 34.7 14.7 100.
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Table 16. CROSSTABULATIONS OF SELECTION FOR ADVANCED ED-
UCATION AND SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION BY PAYGRADE
SELECTION FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED TOTAL
PAYGRADE + + + + +
1 I 12 I 6 I 54 I 15 I 87
2ND LT I I I I i io. 1
+ + + + +
2 I 4 1 5 I 129 I 13 I 151
1ST LT I I I I I 17.5
+ + + + +
3 I 18 I 112 I 168 I 49 I 347
CAPTAIN I I I I I 40.
3
+ + + + +
4 I 12 I 24 I 117 I 23 I 176
MAJOR I I I I I 20.4
+ + + + +
5 I 15 I 18 I 47 I 3 I 83
LT COLONEL I I I I I 9. 6
+ + + + +
6 I 21 71 81 II 18
COLONEL I I I I I 2. 1
+ + + + +
COLUMN 63 172 523 104 862
TOTAL 7.3 20.0 60.7 12.1 100.0
SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
COUNT I
PAYGRADE
2ND LT
1ST LT
CAPTAIN
MAJOR
LT COL
COLONEL
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL
IISFIED D
+ + +
I
I
I
I
+ --•
I
I
+--
I
I
+--
I
I
+--
I
I
+--
COLUMN
TOTAL
10
97
16
I
I
-+
I
I
-+•
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
I
I
-+-
17
+
54
56
56
40
46
76
123
+
131
15.2
228
26.5
I
I
•-+
I
I
-+
I
I
+.
69 I
I
+
19 I
I
+
9 I
I
+
342
39. 7
DISSATIS VERY DIS
FIED SATISFIE
+ + +
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
14
21
71
24
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
20
141
16.4
20
2.3
ROW
TOTAL
10
151
17.5
347
40. 3
176
20.4
83
9. 6
18
2. 1
862
100.
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e. Other Compensation Packages
Table 17 gives a breakdown of respondents by paygrade concerning satis-
faction with government quarters. It shows that about 51.9 percent of the total was
dissatisfied with government quarters. It is interesting to note that no one in the
Lieutenant grades was satisfied with government quarters.
Table 18 displays the distribution of respondents concerning satisfaction
with rewards and leave policies for officer personnel. About 21.7 percent of the officers
surveyed indicated that they were dissatisfied with rewards. In addition, 82.1 percent of
the total were dissatisfied with leave policies. This may be due to the fact that, even
though Army regulations encourage officers to take regular leave twice a year, it is not
always allowed. That seems to be an unwritten law in the Army.
Table 17. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH QUARTERS
BY PAYGRADE
QUARTERS
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
PAYGRADE -+ + + _+ + +
I 1 I 32 I 55 I 1 87
2ND LT I I I
I 1 I 36
II
I 54 I 61 I
10. 1
151
1ST LT I I I
I 17 I 29 I 101
II
I 157 I 43 I
17.5
347
CAPTAIN I I I
I I 22 I 89
I I I
I 65 I 1
40. 3
176
MAJOR I I I
I 19 I 38 I 15
I I I
I 11 I 1
20.4
83
LT COL I I I
+ + +
I 6 1 9 1 2
II
-+ + +
I 11 1
9.6
18
COLONEL I I I
42 98 275
I I I
343 104
2. 1
COLUMN 862
TOTAL 4.9 11.4 31.9 39.8 12.1 100.0
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Table 18. CROSSTABULATIONS OF SATISFACTION WITH REWARDS
AND LEAVE BY PAVGRADE
REWARDS
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
I I 39 I 33 I 15 I I 87
2ND LT I I I I I I 10. 1
I I 45 I 79 I 27 I I 151
1ST LT I I I I I I 17.5
I 102 I 76 I 111 I 43 I 15 I 347
CAPTAIN I
I
I I I I I 40. 3
I 67 I 43 I 54 I 12 I 176
MAJOR I
I
I I I I I 20.4
17 I 19 I 26 I 21 I I 83
LT COL I
I
I I I I I 9.6
4 I 11 I 3 I I I 18
COLONEL I I I I I I 2. 1
COLUMN 123 257 295 160 27 862
TOTAL 14. 3 29. 8 34.2 18.6 3. 1 100.
LEAVE
COUNT I
I SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
ID FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
PAYGRADE ...+- -+ -+ ._.+- +
I I 17 i 3:i I :33 I 87
2ND LT I
+ -
I
I
I
i
I 4!
I
-+-
I
I
+
37 I
10. 1
19 j 151
1ST LT I
+-
I
I
I
I
I Ui
I
+-
I
I
+
36 I
17.5
21 12 1 2( 347
CAPTAIN I
+-
I
I
.+
I
I
I 7>
I
+-
I
I
+
35 I
40. 3
:L7 27 t i 176
MAJOR I I I I I 20.4
I I 36 I 4>r I I 83
LT COL I
+ -
I
+
I
-+
I
+-
I
+
9.6
I I 5 I 1]L I 2 I 18
COLONEL I I I I I 2. 1
COLUMN 38 116 26f 443 862
TOTAL 4. 4 13 .5 30.
:
f 51. 4 100.0
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Table 19 displays the distribution of respondents by paygrade concerning
dissatisfaction with extended work hours. There were 39.8 percent of the respondents
who were dissatisfied with extended work hours when not given any compensation for
the extra work hours. The higher the paygrade of the respondents, the higher was the
degree of dissatisfaction with extended work hours. This could be related to the marital
status of respondents. No one likes extended work hours ; however, the level of dissat-
isfaction differs between married and single personnel. The married personnel tend to
dislike work after service hours.
Table 19. CROSSTABULATION OF DISSATISFACTION WITH EX-
TENDED WORK HOURS BY PAYGRADE
DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENDED WORK HOURS
COUNT I
IVERY DIS DISSATIS NORMAL SATISFIE VERY SAT ROW
ISATISFIE FIED D ISFIED TOTAL
11 12 13 14 15 I
PAYGRADE --- _+ + + + + +
I 01 61 69 I 12 I 01 87
2ND LT I I I I I I
I 1 24 I 81 I 46 I 1
10. 1
151
1ST LT I I I I I I
I 28 I 154 I 107 I 42 I 16 I
17.5
347
CAPTAIN I I I I I I
I 43 I 56 I 44 I 33 I 1
40. 3
176
MAJOR I I I I I I
I 71 11 I 58 I 71 01
20.4
83
LT COL I • I I I I I
I 21 12 I 31 11 01
9.6
18
COLONEL I I I I I I
80 263 362 141 16
2. 1
COLUMN 862
TOTAL 9.3 30.5 42.0 16.4 1.9 100.
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f. Summary
The survey results of 862 officers have shown that the majority of the officer
personnel surveyed found their compensation packages unsuitable. They also found the
current retirement system unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, 88.8 percent of officer personnel
surveyed judged their units' combat readiness to be high, as shown in Table 20.
Moreover, 31.3 percent of the total officers indicated that they were satisfied
with military life, while 26.2 percent of the group responded as dissatisfied, as shown in
Table 21. Officers in lower grades tend to have lower satisfaction with military life.
About 56.3 percent of the total judged their military career as satisfactory. It is very
difficult for foreigners to understand the situation that officers may be satisfied with
military life even though they are not satisfied with compensation packages.
Table 20. CROSSTABULATION OF ESTIMATES OF COMBAT READ-
INESS BY PAYGRADE
ESTIMATES OF COMBAT READINESS
COUNT I
I VERY HIGH NOI LOW VERY ROW
I HIGH LOW TOTAL
11 12 13 14 15 I
I 9 I 24 I 43 I 11 I I 87
2ND LT I I I I I I 10. 1
I I 46 I 87 I 16 I 2 I 151
1ST LT I I I I I I 17. 5
I 61 I 161 I 79 I 31 I 15 I 347
CAPTAIN I I I I I I 40. 3
I 23 I 89 I 43 I 21 I I 176
MAJOR I I I I I I 20.4
I 18 I 54 I 11 I I I 83
LT COL I I I I I I 9.6
I 3 I 13 I 2 I I I 18
COLONEL I I I I I I 2. 1
COLUMN 114 387 265 79 17 862
TOTAL 13. 2 44. 9 30. 7 9. 2 2. 100.
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Table 21. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY
LIFE AND MILITARY CAREER BY PAYGRADE
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
PAYGRADE --- _+ + + + + +
I 10 I 18 I 20 I 39 I 1 87
2ND LT I I I I I I
I 1 39 I 54 I 44 I 14 I
10. 1
151
1ST LT I I I I I I
I 15 I 67 I 200 I 65 I 1
17.5
347
CAPTAIN I I I I I I
I 21 I 23 I 79 I 53 I 1
40.3
176
MAJOR I I I I I I
I 29 I 25 I 18 I 11 I 1
20.4
83
LT COL I I I I I I
I 61 81 41 01 01
9.6
18
COLONEL I I I I I I
81 180 375 212 14
2. 1
COLUMN 862
TOTAL 9.4 20.9 43.5 24.6 1.6
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER
100.0
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
PAYGRADE --- _+ + + + + +
I 14 I 33 I 14 I 24 I 2 1 87
2ND LT I I I I I I
I 34 I 36 I 59 I 19 I 3 1
10. 1
151
1ST LT I I I I I I
I 68 I 81 I 164 I 18 I 16 I
17.5
347
CAPTAIN I I I I I I
I 66 I 74 I 25 I 11 I 1
40. 3
176
MAJOR I I I I I I
I 51 I 11 I 18 I 3 1 1
20.4
83
LT COL I I I I I I
+ + + + + +
I 10 I 71 11 01 01
9.6
18
COLONEL I I I I I I
243 242 281 75 21
2. 1
COLUMN 862
TOTAL 28.2 28.1 32.6 8.7 2.4 100.0
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2. Results from NPS Students Questionnaire
There were 30 respondents returning the questionnaire that was administered
at the Naval Postgraduate School. Table 22 indicates the distribution of the respondents
by paygrade and service branch. Paygrade distribution was one Lieutenant, 12 Captains,
16 Majors, and one LT Colonel. Branches represented for the respondents were 12
Infantry, 3 Artillery, 6 Engineer, 5 Communication, and 4 other branches. All were
graduates of the Korea Military Academy, except one officer commissioned from an
ROTC program. Though this sample is not considered large enough to make broad
generations, it does supplement the analysis of ROK Army compensation policies.
Table 22. CROSSTABULATION OF SERVICE BRANCH BY PAYGRADE
BRANCH
COUNT I
I INFANTRY ARTILLER ENGINEER COMMUNIC OTHERS ROW
I Y ATION TOTAL
PAYGRADE ---+ + + + + +
I II 01 01 01 01 1
1ST LT I I I I I 13.3
+ + + + + +
I 31 01 21 41 31 12
CAPTAIN I I I I I I 40.
I 81 21 41 II II 16
MAJOR I I I I I 153.3
I 01 II 01 01 01 1
LT COL I I I I I 13.3
COLUMN 12 3 6 5 4 30
TOTAL 40.0 10.0 20.0 16.7 13.3 100.0
Table 23 shows the frequency of reasons why the respondents chose to stay in
the military. In order to accurately assess the attitudes of the respondents, the re-
spondent was asked to select one or more reasons why he was staying in the service.
Each respondent chose an average of 3 reasons from the 9 items given in the example.
The numbers (1 through 9) under the cell of 'VALUE' represent the serial order of U.
S. Navy officers' reasons for staying in the military service. The result shown in Table
23 differs from those of U. S. Navy officers. Specifically, ROK Army students at NPS
responded that they were staying in the service "for the opportunity to serve my country"
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as the most significant reason, while U. S. Navy officers indicated it as the fourth. No
one chose "to obtain a military retirement".
Table 23. FREQUENCY OF REASONS STAYING IN SERVICE
REASONS STAYING INI SERVICE
VALID CUM
VALUE LABEL VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
TO PERFORM MEANINGFUL, 1 20 23.3 23.3 23.3
CHALLENGING WORK
TO OBTAIN RESPONSIBILITY 2 6 7.0 7.0 30. 3
AND AUTHORITY POSITIONS
TO USE MY ABILITIES, 3 13 15. 1 15. 1 45.4
SKILLS, EDUCATION
FOR THE OPPORTUNITY 4 21 24.4 24.4 69.8
TO SERVE MY COUNTRY
TO OBTAIN A MILITARY 5 69. 8
RETIREMENT
TO OBTAIN GOOD PAY AND 6 2 2.3 2.3 72. 1
ALLOWANCES
FOR THE OPPORTUNITY 7 11 12. 8 12. 8 84.9
TO COMMAND
TO ENJOY MILITARY LIFE 8 8 9.3 9.3 94.2
OTHERS 9 5 5.8 5.8 100.0
TOTAL 86 100. 100.0
Over 83 percent of the respondents indicated that they were dissatisfied with
their RMC as compared with civilian earnings. The remaining respondents (16.7 per-
cent) estimated that their RMC was comparable to the earnings of their civilian
counterparts. No one answered that he earned more than his civilian counterpart, as
shown in Table 24.
Table 25 displays the distribution of the respondents concerning their expecta-
tion for RMC compared with their civilian counterparts. In considering military job
characteristics, such as wartime risk, frequent movings, hazardous missions and
trainings, family separation, DMZ duty, and extended work hours, 70 percent of the re-
spondents thought that their RMC should be greater than civilian's earnings. About
26.7 percent indicated that their RMC should be similar to that of their civilian
counterpart, while 3.3 percent felt it should be lower.
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Table 24. CROSSTABULATION OF SATISFACTION WITH CURRENT
RMC BY PAYGRADE
SATISFACTION
WITH RMC
RMC IS GREATER THAN
CIVILIAN EARNINGS
RMC IS COMPARABLE TO
CIVILIAN EARNINGS
RMC IS LOWER THAN
CIVILIAN EARNINGS
COLUMN
TOTAL
PAYGRADE
COUNT I
I 1ST LT CAPTAIN MAJOR LT COL
I
I I
I I
I 1 4 I
I I
I 1 11 12 I 1
I
+
I
1
3. 3
12
40.
16
53. 3
1
3. 3
ROW
TOTAL
0.0
5
16. 7
25
83. 3
30
100.
Table 25. CROSSTABULATIONS OF RMC EXPECTATION COMPARING
WITH CHILIAN COUNTERPART
PAYGRADE
COUNT I
RMC I 1ST
EXPECTATION I
LT CAPTAIN MAJOR
11 7 1 12
I I
1 5 1 3
I I
1 1 1
I I
LT COL
-+ +
I 1 I
I I
I I
I I
ROW
TOTAL
l.RMC SHOULD BE
GREATER THAN CIVILIAN
—
i
I
I
+
I
I
+
I
I
21
70.
2. RMC SHOULD BE
SIMILAR TO CIVILIAN
8
26. 7
3. RMC SHOULD BE
LOWER THAN CIVILIAN
COLUMN
TOTAL
I I
I I
1
3. 3
30
100.03.
1 12 16
3 40.0 53.3
1
3.3
Table 26 indicates the respondents' expectations relative to compensation and
job security. They were asked to select one response from the expectations that had
been given, such as lifetime employment in the military, remarkable increases in current
RMC, and others. About 60 percent of the respondents chose lifetime employment,
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while 40 percent of the total preferred the improvement of current RMC conditions.
The table shows that, as their paygrade goes up, they tend to slightly prefer lifetime
employment over the improvement of RMC conditions.
Table 26. CROSSTABULATION OF CHOICE OF EXPECTATION BE-
TWEEN COMPENSATION AND JOB SECURITY BY
PAYGRADE
CHOICE OF
EXPECTATION
COUNT
PAYGRADE
I
I 1ST LT CAPTAIN MAJOR LT COLON
I EL
--+ + + + +
I 1 7 I 10 I 11
I I I I I
I 11 51 61 01
I I I I I
1 12 16 1
3.3 40.0 53.3 3.3
ROW
TOTAL
1. LIFETIME
EMPLOYMENT
18
60.0
2. IMPROVEMENT
OF RMC LEVEL
12
40.0
COLUMN
TOTAL
30
100.0
Table 27 displays the distribution of the respondents' expectations concerning
their job security in the future. About 93.9 percent of the respondents estimated that
they would leave the military someday and get another job, feeling that the military
could not give them the opportunity for lifetime employment. There were only 6.7 per-
cent of the total who judged their job security as permanent.
Table 28 displays the opinions of the respondents relative to the best method for
the retention of high quality officers. Eighteen respondents suggested that the ROK
Army should first improve the compensation level for the retention of qualified officers.
Seventeen respondents also pointed out that the Army should offer the officer corps job
security and lifetime employment policies. It is very interesting to note that improve-
ment of the compensation package was preferred more by junior officers, while senior
officers preferred job security over compensation improvement. One of the most sur-
prising comments was that almost all officers indicated that the ROK Army could not
recruit or retain high quality officers solely based on loyalty and patriotic spirit.
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Table 27. CROSSTABULATION OF EXPECTATION OF JOB SECURITY
BY PAYGRADE
PAYGRADE
COUNT I
I 1ST LT CAPTAIN MAJOR LT COL ROW
EXPECTATION I TOTAL
+ + + + +
1. EXPECT AS A I 01 II II 01 2
LIFETIME JOB I I I I I 6. 7
+ + + + +
2. CANNOT EXPECT AS I II 11 I 15 I II 28
A LIFETIME JOB I I I I I 93. 3
+ + + + +
COLUMN 1 12 16 1 30
TOTAL 3. 3 40. 53. 3 3. 3 100.
Table 28. FREQUENCY OF OPINIONS FOR RETENTION OF HIGH
QUALITY OFFICERS
OPINION TOTAL JUNIOR SENIOR
VALUE LABEL ORDER FREQUENCY GRADE GRADE
1. IMPROVEMENT OF
COMPENSATION PACKAGES
1 18 11 7
2. JOB SECURITY AND
LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT
2 17 8 9
3. ELIMINATION OF AUTHORITY
IN MILITARY SOCIETY
3 8 8
4. EXPANSION OF OPPORTUNITY
FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION
4 7 2 5
5. ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW-
MILITARY ETHOS
5 6 4 2
6. EFFICIENT AND SCIENTIFIC
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
6 4 2 2
7. INCREASED RECOGNITION FOR
EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE
6 4 3 1
8. PUBLIC INFORMATION FOR
MILITARY LIFE
6 4 3 1
9. IMPROVEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
QUARTERS AND FACILITIES
7 3 2 1
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. COMPENSATION POLICIES
A result of both surveys that seems at first glance to be relatively minor really is of
great overall importance. That result is the difference between the distributions of sat-
isfaction with military life and compensation. The distribution of satisfaction with mili-
tary life should be affected by satisfaction with military compensation packages in a
normal manner. However, this is not necessarily true in the ROK Army. It is very dif-
ficult for foreign people to understand this aspect of Korean ethos. A major proportion
of the respondents were not satisfied with current military compensation packages, ex-
tended work hours, hazardous job conditions, frequent movings, and family separation.
Nevertheless, a large number of the respondents were satisfied with military life, because
they believe that serving their country without concern for personal profitability is the
best worth in life.
The traditional Korean ethos has been changing along with changes in the social
environment. Korean society has been at the edge of multi-consumption since the late
1970s, due to the rapid growth of the economy. Therefore, many young men prefer to
get a job that would provide a stable and economic life. Youths do not want to join the
military without substantial compensation for their service to the country. As shown in
Table 28, the ROK Army of today could not recruit and retain high quality officers
based solely on loyalty and patriotic spirit.
The ROK Army compensation packages have taken a turn for the better as the ci-
vilian wage levels increase. However, the level of military compensation still is far below
average civilian earnings. The services have typically indicated that if pay policies do
not meet junior officers' needs, these officers may leave the military just after completion
of the compulsory service term.
Approximately two-thirds of the respondents were not satisfied with current military
compensation policies. A large percentage of the respondents indicated that their RMC
was much lower than that in the comparable civilian sector, and that their RMC should
be higher than civilian average earnings. About 63 percent of the respondents on the
first survey indicated that they were dissatisfied with their RMC itself, and about 68.9
42
percent of respondents indicated that they were dissatisfied with their pay level compared
with that of their civilian counterpart.
It is also interesting to note that the degree of academy graduates' dissatisfaction
with RMC was slightly higher than that of others. Approximately 83.3 percent of re-
spondents to the NTS survey, who all were graduates of the military academy, indicated
that their RMC was lower than the average earnings of their civilian counterpart. About
70 percent of the respondents also indicated that their RMC should be higher than
compensation in the civilian sector, when considering military job characteristics. This
refers to the fact that their expectations of compensation are slightly higher than non-
academy graduates, because they may be assigned to key positions in a unit, and thus
have more difficult assignments. It could be explained that academy graduates' dissat-
isfaction with extended work hours was much higher than that of the total respondents.
The respondents in paygrade Captain and above were predominantly married;
however, these career personnel were far from adhering strictly to the present pay and
allowance system. As members become more senior and accept more job responsibility,
they also become more independent and self-reliant.
A sizeable portion of junior officers were more dissatisfied with their RMC than
were senior officers. Moreover, as paygrade decreases, the proportion of allowances to
base pay decreases, as shown in Table 5. That fact infers that some incentive allowances
do not have any effect on the retention of junior officers. As shown in Table 7, as the
members become more junior, their RMC level becomes lower. Basically, the base pay
of the junior officer, without distinction of long-term or compulsory service, is not usu-
ally applied to living expenses but used more as pocket money. Because junior officers
might not have dependents, the government provides Bachelor Officer Quarters, and
mess dining facilities.
Obviously, current military compensation policies do not compensate members for
their selfless contribution to the country. Even though they are being provided govern-
ment quarters and medical care, a large percentage of the respondents were not satisfied
with those compensation packages. Business firms also provide those compensation
packages to their employees. Although several kinds of basic allowances are provided,
they have little effect on retention of junior officers, because the proportion of allow-
ances to base pay is too small. Special allowances such as allowance for hazards and
technical allowance also do not provide satisfaction to junior officers. Thus, the re-
tention effect of RMC and special allowances on junior officers is probably small.
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Most respondents also indicated that a special allowance for typical military job
conditions should be provided for recruitment and retention of qualified officer person-
nel. Currently, DMZ duty allowance is provided to only the enlisted personnel. How-
ever, a sizeable portion of the respondents suggested that a DMZ duty allowance should
be provided to officer personnel when assigned to DMZ and FEBA (Forward Edge
Battle Area) duty. A major proportion of junior officers who are serving in compulsory
service may be assigned to the DMZ and FEBA, usually isolated from nearby civilian
villages. They are usually not afforded leave and a break time, even on holidays and
weekends. However, there is no hardship allowance for service without holidays and
leave at the DMZ or FEBA. Junior officers probably recognize that DMZ duty is a way
of military life. Under these conditions, it is very hard to get high retention of qualified
officers.
When the world-wide depression in the economy arose in 1973 and 1979 (the first
and second oil shock), the retention rates of junior officers increased remarkably.
However, it was doubtful that a significant proportion of qualified people really wanted
to stay in the Army. Of course, there are a lot of factors that go into the retention de-
cision. Compensation is only one of the factors. If members feel that the service is
sincerely concerned with their individual needs and that compensation is equitable, the
probability of recruiting and the retention of high quality youths would probably be
higher than at present.
B. PERSONNEL MANPOWER MANAGEMENT POLICIES
A large percentage of the respondents of the NPS survey indicated that the ROK
Army needs to improve not only compensation policies but also the condition of job
security when attempting to recruit and retain high quality officers. Improvement of job
security conditions is necessary not only for high retention, but also for efficient man-
power management of the ROK Army.
As described in chapter I, the ROK Army should improve a significant problem in
manpower management, which is the shortage of officer personnel. The personnel
manpower requirements for the military services in Korea are approximately 430,000
youths every year for both officer and enlisted personnel. However, the youth popu-
lation of service age has gradually decreased since the early 1980s, and continues to de-
crease through 1985. This is a result of the government-administered policy of reducing
birth-rates in 1962 and the youth population just now coming of age for military service.
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If the youth population of service age does not meet the personnel manpower re-
quirement needs of the services, two methods are suggested: to reduce military strengths
or to increase the term of military service (currently 30 months as an enlisted person in
the Army). However, it is impossible to reduce military strength when confronted with
North Korea's increasing military strength. Therefore, the government had to focus on
the extension of the term of militarv service. As a result, the militarv service law, con-
cerned with extension of the military service term of enlisted personnel, was revised in
1985.
As the youth population decreases, the recruitment of officer personnel also be-
comes more difficult. Consequently, the quality of officer personnel is getting lower and
lower. Thus, the ROK Army should strive to improve the efficiency of its manpower
management system.
1. Promotion and Retirement Systems
A large portion of the respondents indicated that the ROK Army should work
to improve the current promotion system. Primarily, this is necessary for efficient per-
sonnel manpower management, and could solve the problem of officer shortage and re-
duce manpower costs.
A sizeable proportion of the respondents who were graduates of the military
academy pointed out the fact that the minimum time-in-grade requirements for pro-
motion are too short, and that they could hardly have the opportunity to improve their
knowledge or acquire experience since time requirements in key positions is critical to
career paths.
For example, the minimum time in grade requirement for Captain is four years.
In the case of an infantry officer, just after promotion to Captain, he must take the Of-
ficer Advanced Course (OAC) for six months and then take over the post of a rifle
company commander for 30 months. Thus, he must spend 36 months as the basic re-
quirement for careers advancement. After finishing a term as company commander, he
is probably assigned to a staff officer position of a Battalion or Regiment Headquarters
to prepare to be selected for promotion to the next higher grade.
Such a fast promotion system hardly utilizes personnel manpower efficiently for
very long. If the officer is not selected for promotion in a given time, he must leave the
service. As the result, the Army has to spend more to educate and train replacement
officer personnel, and does meet the problem of officer personnel shortages. Therefore,
if the minimum time in grade requirement is extended by changing the current pro-
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motion system, the Army can utilize officer manpower for a longer time and cope with
the problem of officer shortages.
The second purpose is to obtain the effect of increasing officers' satisfaction
relative to job security, so that the officer corps can serve in the military with high mo-
rale and sincerity, and the Army can sustain high levels of combat readiness. As shown
in Table 27, 93.3 percent of the respondents estimated that they expected to leave the
military in the near future and get a civilian job because of the cost of living. As mem-
bers become more senior, they have more concerns about job security than have junior
officers. The respondents in senior grades also prefer the improvement of job security
conditions over compensation packages, while junior officers prefer the improvement of
compensation packages over the improvement of job security. This may indicate that
senior officers obtain higher levels of RMC as compared with junior officers, and that
they have to leave the military sooner than junior officers. Therefore, the changing of
the current promotion system may offer the officer corps the opportunity of staying in
the service more along the line of lifetime employment.
The retirement system is directly related to the promotion system. As described
in the previous section, each officer of the Army who is not recommended for promotion
to the next higher grade must be retired on the earliest date stipulated by the law of
mandatory retirements. A majority of officers who were retired by the mandatory re-
tirements had to leave the military because of maximum service years in each grade.
For example, the conditions of mandatory retirement in the paygrade of Captain
are a maximum 8 years service as a Captain, 14 years of service, and 43 years old. If
an officer was commissioned at age 24, he could be promoted to Captain at least by age
28, which is four years after commission. In considering years of service, he could re-
main in the service until his 38th birthday (i. e., 14 years from age 24) or until his 43rd
birthday when considering maximum age. However, he must leave the military before
age 36 by the maximum years service in grade, which is the earlier date of the conditions
of current mandatory requirement. If the law were such that the officer shall be retired
on the latest of the dates, he could serve in the military until age 43 as a maximum.
Thus, if he is not selected for promotion, he would leave the military 7 years earlier when
compared with retirement due to maximum age. Therefore, if the Army revises the
condition of mandatory retirement requirements, the Army can use its officer personnel
for a longer time and thus cope with the problem of manpower shortages.
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Any organization within the military or most businesses has basically a pyra-
midal form of rank structure. Under this organizational structure, as members reach a
higher rank, promotion opportunity to the next higher rank is getting more and more
difficult.
As members become more senior, the proportion of promotion for academy
graduates increases considerably. It means that the promotion of non-academy gradu-
ates is getting more and more difficult. Thus, almost all junior officers who are not
graduates of the academy realize the fact that their promotion opportunity is getting
more difficult as they progress higher and higher up the pyramid, and thus would have
negative effect for retention of qualified officers.
2. Cost and Effectiveness
It is not easy to analyze the cost and effectiveness of current systems as com-
pared with an alternative, specifically focusing on training costs and manpower effi-
ciency. Table 29 shows the typical education and training costs of an infantry officer
who was commissioned after graduation from the Korea Military Academy (KMA).
The reason why the academy graduate is selected as a sample of the model is that they
have typical education and training courses rather than others.
The major portion of the education and training costs for an infantry officer is
the result of education and training at the KMA for 4 years. The costs for the education
at the KMA was calculated from the total budget of the KMA divided by the total
number of cadets for 4 years, which included base pay of cadets for 4 years. The costs
of other courses did not include the base pay and allowances of the officer students.
The military's investment of the military in the education and training of its
members is probably greater than that of any organizations in the government or private
sector in Korea. Nevertheless, the ROK Army may not be paying much attention to
the returns of its investment. The Army should consider the effect of its investment in
the education and training of officer personnel relative to efficient personnel manpower
management. Thus, the higher the extension rate of qualified officers, the lower the
manpower costs being consumed for training of recruited personnel.
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Table 29. TYPICAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING COSTS OF THE
ACADEMY GRADUATED INFANTRY OFFICER, IN 1987
(Unit : WON)
Courses Period Paygrade Cost per person
Military Academy 4 years Cadets 33,765.000
Officer Basic Course 1 8 weeks 2 LT 1.307.000
Officer Advanced Course 28 weeks Captain 1.090,000
Army War College 16-48
weeks Major 2,443,776
Total Cost - - 38,605.776
* Source : Current costs of Training and Education for the Officer Personnel reported
by the Office of Accounting Department, 1988.
Table 30 shows the average service years of academy graduates in the current
promotion and retirement systems : Case 1 is the case of officers who promoted to
General officers with average service of 26 years ; Case 2 is the case of those who pro-
moted to Colonel, but did not promote to General, and average years of service of 24
years ; Case 3 is the case of officers who did not promote to Colonel and retired with
paygrade of LT Colonel with average years of service of 19 years. The proportion of
each case in the cohort was estimated to be 15 percent for Case 1, 40 percent for Case
2, and 45 percent for Case 3. Therefore, the total average of service years of the acad-
emy graduates might be less than 23 years.
Almost all academy graduates promote to at least LT Colonel. Among them,
less than 55 percent promote to Colonel, and less than 15 percent of the total graduates
might promote to General. Thus, approximately 45 percent of academy graduates must
leave the military before their 20th year in the service, even though the Army had in-
vested a tremendous cost in their education and training.
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Table 30. CURRENT AVERAGE YEARS OF SERVICE OF ACADEMY
GRADUATES
Paygrade Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Lieutenant 3 3 3
Captain 4 4 4
Major 4 4 4
LT Colonel 5 6 8
Colonel 5 8 -
General 6 - -
Total Y'ears of Service 27 25 19
Portion of the Cohort 15 % 40 % 45 %
Average Years of Service
of Total Cohort
22.6 Years
* Source : Adapted from ROK Army Regulation 1 10 - 3, "Officer Personnel ; Sepa-
rations", and Data from The Personnel Department of ROK Army Headquarters.
Table 31 displays the estimated years of service of academy graduates when
considering alternative changes in the promotion and retirement system in the ROK
Army. This alternative model does not consider all of the factors that affect the per-
sonnel manpower management of the ROK Army. It is just an example of the alterna-
tives available when considering the efficient management of manpower, which might
lead to the elimination of manpower problems and the expansion of job security for the
recruiting and retention of high quality officers.
The minimum time-in-grade requirement for promotion, in the case of the al-
ternative model, is extended one year longer than the current system, which is improved
over consideration of maximum years of service in the retirement system. As a result,
if an officer promotes to General, he could serve in the military for at least 33 years,
which is 6 years greater than under the current system. Even if he could not promote
to Colonel, it might be possible to stay in the service for a minimum of 24 years, which
is 5 years longer than that of the current system. These changes in the promotion and
retirement systems would be helpful for efficient manpower management of the ROK
Armv. In other words, extension of years of service is necessary for not only recruiting
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and retention of high quality officers, but also for reducing the costs of training of offi-
cers.
Table 31. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR EXTENTED YEARS OF
SERVICE OF THE ACADEMY GRADUATES
Paygrade Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Lieutenant 5 5 5
Captain 5 5 5
Major 5 5 5
LT Colonel 6 6 9
Colonel 6 9 -
General 6 - -
Total Years of Service 33 30 24
Portion of the Cohort 15 % 40 % 45 %
Average Years of Service
of Total Cohort
27.8 Years
Therefore, an improvement of the current promotion and retirement system
could have the effect of increasing the efficiency of personnel manpower management,
by eliminating manpower problems and strengthening the levels of combat readiness of
the ROK Army, through the recruiting and retention of high quality officers.
C. OTHER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICIES
A large proportion of the respondents indicated that the ROK Army should strive
to resolve some insufficiencies of personnel management for the successful recruiting and
retention of qualified personnel. A majority of the respondents suggested that the Army
make efforts to remove typical military authoritarianism, such as exact obedience to any
order of a superior, ignoring a junior officer's reasonable suggestion, and extended work
hours without compensation. These shortcomings caused by authoritarianism probably
reduce the retention of high quality officers.
A significant proportion of the respondents also suggested that the Army should
strive to work for an efficient personnel management system, specifically focusing on
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reasonable selections for promotion and advanced education, fairness of performance
evaluations of officer personnel, and fairness of rewards. They also suggested expansion
of education opportunity as a way to increase retention rates. This dissatisfaction with
the quality of personnel management in the Army undoubtedly had a negative effect on
qualified officers' retention decisions.
Dissatisfaction with the quality and conditions of government quarters was consid-
erable for junior officers. Dissatisfaction with leave was also greatest regardless of
paygrade. This dissatisfaction with quarters and leave also had a negative effect on
junior officers' retention decisions.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This research has examined current military compensation policies with a view to-
ward identifying and recommending the most appropriate compensation policies for the
recruitment and retention of high quality officers.
The most obvious finding of both surveys is the desire by sizeable portions of all
respondents for changes in the present compensation system. In general, present com-
pensation policies are not sufficient enough to cope with the problems of personnel
manpower management of the ROK Army. Specific policy changes that might be indi-
cated by the surveys are as follows :
1. Pay compensation should be improved to at least the level of the civilian sector,
specifically focusing on increasing initial base pay of junior officers and a special allow-
ance compensating for typical military job conditions and DMZ/FEBA duty. Before
finishing their compulsory service, junior officers probably compare military compen-
sation with level of civilian compensation that they could obtain by entering a private
firm after military service. However, current levels of military pay do not compare fa-
vorably with compensation in the civilian sector. Compensations of this type may al-
ready be having an adverse effect on the retention rate of high quality officers. The
Army should offer sufficient compensation to the officers who want to serve in the mil-
itary after compulsory service. All officers should be considered, though the Army may
wish to give special attention to career military officers with between 3 and 10 years of
service. This would eliminate pay differentials between the military and the civilian
sectors, and increase recruitment and retention rates of high quality officers.
2. Current promotion and retirement systems should be improved for enhancing job
security of officer personnel. All officers would like to be able to serve by their age of
late 50's as like the civilian sectors where the average of employees retire as a middle
manager when their age becomes late 50's. In the long run, providing this job security
would increase individual satisfaction and retention rates of high quality officers, and
reduce the present manpower problem and training costs.
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3. The Army should attempt to improve its own constitution, not only to increase
the levels of combat readiness but also to increase the retention rate of high quality of-
ficers, as follows :
• The authoritarianism in the Army should be eliminated for the democratization of
military life.
• The management and operations of the Army should be rationalized for efficiency
and effectiveness.
• Most education and training should be undertaken with the objective of cultivating
professionals.
• Individual capabilities should be esteemed primarily at the process of selection for
promotion or education, and assignment to a key position.
Of course, it is impossible to expect immediate improvement of the Army's consti-
tution. However, the Army should strive gradually to set it. Basically, the regulations
for routine work must be kept for providing personal freedom after duty-hours, and
regular leave.
4. The Army should expand the opportunity of education for degrees. The majority
of those who get the opportunity of education are academy graduates. Thus, non-
academy graduates are not satisfied the result of selection for advanced education. The
expansion of education opportunities would provide greater incentive for the junior of-
ficer to remain in the Army.
5. The ROK Army should strive to make its personnel management system more
objective. Performance evaluation and rewards systems should be improved not only to
set a fairness of promotion selection, but also to provide increased recognition for ex-
cellent performance.
6. The ROK Army should pay attention on the public information for military life,
which would increase the recruitment of excellent youths and the retention of high
quality personnel.
7. The ROK Army should improve the quality and conditions of government
quarters and facilities. There is a sizeable portion of married junior officers who are not
provided quarters because of the shortage of the facilities.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study is explanatory and is intended to build a framework for further analyses.
The results suggest that certain changes in the compensation policies of the ROK Army
could have a positive influence on the recruitment and retention of high quality officers.
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This finding is based largely on the responses of ROK Army officers to questions on two
separate surveys. However, it should be noted that survey responses of the type exam-
ined here often tend to overstate the true level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a
particular situation or policy. Survey respondents understand that expressions of satis-
faction with pay or living conditions or the quality of military life will lead policymakers
to accept the status quo and leave as much as possible unchanged. In particular terms,
this means that no steps will be taken to raise pay or make improvements in areas where
dissatisfaction does not appear to exist. When survey respondents are given anonymity,
then, they may be more inclined to be "dissatisfied" with items such as compensation-
realizing that there is nothing to be lost and something to be gained (a pay raise) by
expressing their dissatisfaction.
A good test of members dissatisfaction is behavior. Survey responses can be linked
with behavior through data file matching or longitudinal studies when personal identifi-
ers are available. For example, there would be greater certainty that a particular ex-
pression of dissatisfaction about compensation was honestly stated if it could be shown
that this attitude may have contributed directly to the member's decision to leave the
military. The attempt to correlate attitudes with behavior would be an important area
for further research.
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APPENDIX A. BASIC PAY MATRIX
Table 32. BASIC PAY MATRIX, 1980 - 1988
(Thousands of 19SS Wons)
YOS Paygrade 1980 1981 1982 1983 4 1985 1986 1987 1988
- 1 2 LT 91.0 100.1 105.1 143.5 148.5 157.3 163.3 177.9
1-
1 LT
100.8 110.9 120.9 159.2 164.2 173.9 180.5 196.7
">_ 108.6 119.5 130.3 169.1 174.1 184.4 191.4 208.6
3 -
CPT
12S.9 14S.0 157.7 209.7 214.7 227.4 236.1 257.5
4 - 13S.2 156.5 169.0 221.6 226.6 240.0 249.2 271.5
5 . 147.5 167.0 180.3 233.5 238.5 252.6 262.3 285.8
6- 156.8 177.5 191.6 245.4 250.4 265.2 275.4 300.1
•^
MAJ
179.0 202. S 218.9 2"4.2 2~9.2 295.7 307.5 334.2
S - 1S6.9 214.S 231.8 287.8 292.8 301.1 322.4 350.6
9 - 200.2 226.8 244.7 301.4 306.4 324.5 3 3 -.3 367.0
lO- 210.8 238.8 257.6 315.0 310.0 338.9 "}>"» 2 383.
4
ll -
LT COL
247.9 275.2 294.4 352.4 357.4 371.1 385.2 419.3
12 - 258.5 287.0 307.0 365.6 376.6 386.2 400.9 436.5
13 - 269.1 298.8 319.6 378.8 383.8 401.3 416.6 453.7
14 - 77Q 7 310.6 332.4 392.0 397.0 416.4 432.3 4 "0.9
15 - 290.3 322.4 3-14.8 405.2 410.2 431.5 448.0 4S8.1
16-
COL
332.9 356.4 377.8 428.3 433.3 452.0 469.3 511.4
17 - 343.7 368.0 390.1 441.2 446.2 466.7 484.6 528.1
IS - 354.5 379.6 402.4 454.1 459.1 481.4 499.9 544.8
19 - 365.3 391.2 414.7 467.0 472.0 496.1 5"5.2 561.5
20- 378.1 402.8 427.0 4"9.9 484.9 510.8 530.5 578.2
- 1 The government budget of FY 1984 was frozen.
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APPENDIX B. ROK ARMY HEADQUARTERS QUESTIONNAIRE
***** Note *****
• The original questionnaire was composed of 107 questions, however, 29 questions were
selected, concerned with the thesis topics.
In answering to each question in section B, please answer on your answer sheet such as
following example :
[ Example ]
* Strong Agree 1
* Agree 2
*So-So 3
* Disagree 4
* Strong Disagree 5
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A. BACKGROUND
1. In what branch are you serving ?
( )
(1) Infantry (2) Artillery (3) Armor
(4) Engineer (5) Communication (6) Others
2. What is your present paygrade ?
( )
(1) 2 LT (2) 1 LT (3) CPT (4) MAJ (5) LT COL (6) COL
3. How long have you been on active duty ?
( ) years of service
4. How old were you on your last birthday ?
( ) years old
5. What is your marital status ? ( )
(1) Single (2) Married (3) Others
B. GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
1. I think that I have pretty good adaptability to the military life.
2. I am quite satisfied with military career.
3. I think that military job coincides with my personal characteristics and preferences.
4. Military compensation package ''< comparable to that of the civilian with same ca-
reer.
5. My tasks are too much to accomplish in proper time.
6. There is no problem concerning government quarters for officer personnel.
7. I have no problems in purchasing military clothes (utilization of military clothes
exchange).
8. I think the citizens have good trust in military.
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9. I have too much frequent times of day duty.
10. Rewardings in my unit are being done fairly.
11. I am concerned about finding job after retirement.
12. National security is the best important among other things as economical, social
stability.
13. My unit has a good combat readiness to enemy's attack.
14. I think it is very difficult for the retirees to connect military career with the civilian
jobs
15. Military pay level is proper when comparing with that of civilian sector.
16. I am very satisfied for being in military life.
17. I think the completion of performance evaluation is done with fairness.
18. It is very difficult to purchase electronic appliances on proper time.
19. There are many senior officers who are not willing to listen to their subordinates.
20. There are enough facilities provided for sports and recreation activities.
21. There are some military personnel who are worry about their debt problems.
22. I am quite agree with the selection process for promotion in the Army.
23. Currently, retirement benefits are well reflecting the compensation for the past
military active service.
24. I should frequently stay in the base for extended work hours.
25. Medical care for the active service personnel is not provided by some reasons.
26. Most officer personnel is satisfied with the results of selection for advanced edu-
cations.
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27. I am satisfied with my residential environments such like school, shopping and
public transportation.
28. There are many military personnel who are dissatisfied with the requirements of
mandatory retirements.
29. Regular leave for officer personnel is well scheduled and executed.
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APPENDIX C. COMPENSATION QUESTIONNAIRE
( NPS Students Survey )
A. BACKGROUND
1. In what branch are you serving ?
(1) Infantry
(4) Engineer
(2) Artillery
(5) Communication
(3) Armor
(6) Others
( )
2. What is your present paygrade ? ( )
(1) 2 LT (2) 1 LT (3) CPT (4) MAJ (5) LT COL (6) COL
3. How long have you been on active duty ?
( ) years of service
4. How old were you on your last birthday ?
( ) years old
5. What is your marital status ?
(1) Single (2) Married
( )
(3) Others
6. How long have you served at the DMZ areas ?
( ) years of service
7. What was (were) the significant reason(s) in your joining to the officer corps ? ( )
a. To perform meaningful and challenging work
b. To obtain positions of responsibility or authority
c. To use my abilities, skills, and education
d. For the opportunity to serve my country
e. To obtain a military retirement
f. To obtain good pay and allowances
g. For the opportunity to command
h. To enjoy military life
i. Others
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B. MILITARY COMPENSATION
8. Comparing your present RMC with civilian's earnings with the same age, which of
the following items is the best statement ? ( )
a. My RMC is greater than civilian's earnings
b. My RMC is similar to civilian's earnings
c. My RMC is lower tan civilian's earnings
9. Considering military characteristics such as, wartime risk, frequent movings,
hazardous mission and training, family separation, DMZ duty, and extended work
hour, which of the following conditions would you prefer ? ( )
a. RMC should be greater than civilian's earnings
b. RMC should be similar to civilian's earnings
c. RMC should be lower than civilian's earnings
C. PROMOTION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
10. In terms of job security, which of the following statement is the best proper
in considering your expectations both of promotion and retirement ? ( )
a. I can expect to serve in the military for my lifetime
b. Someday I should get another job when I have to leave the military
c. Not sure
11. If you were given a opportunity to chose one of between the improvement of
current RMC and lifetime work in the military, which of the condition would you
prefer ? ( )
a. Lifetime work in the service
b. The improvement of current RMC
c. Others
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D. GENERAL COMPENSATION POLICY
12. Please give me any additional comments concerned
a. For Retention of qualified officers
b. For Efficient Personnel management of the Army
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APPENDIX D. COMPUTERIZED PROGRAM FOR ANALYSIS (SPSSX)
TITLE ' SURVEY
l
1
FILE HANDLE SURVEY 1 / NAME=' SURVEY 1 DATA Al'
FILE HANDLE TEST / NAME = 'TEST SYS Al'
DATA LIST FILE=SURVEY1 REC0RDS=1 FIXED TABLES
/l PAYGRADE 2 (A)
BRANCH 4 (A)
AGE 6-7 (A)
YOS 9-10 (A)
MSTATUS 12 (A)
ADAPTBLT 14 (A)
CARSAT 16 (A)
COINCIDE 18 (A)
PAYLEVEL 20 (A)
OVERWORK 22 (A)
READINES 24 (A)
QUARTERS 26 (A)
MILCLOTH 28 (A)
RELIABLT 30 (A)
DAYDUTY 32 (A)
REWARDS 34 (A)
RETIRJOB 36 (A)
NATNSECU 38 (A)
MCRELATN 40 (A)
PAYSATI S 42 (A)
MILSAT 44 (A)
EVALUATN 46 (A)
PXUTLZTN 48 (A)
COMNATTD 50 (A)
REGREATS 52 (A)
DEBTPROB 54 (A)
PROMOTN 56 (A)
FRNGBNFT 58 (A)
EXTENDWH 60 (A)
MEDICAL 62 (A)
SELECTS" 64 (A)
ENVIRMT 66 (A)
RETIRMNT 68 (A)
LEAVE 70 (A)
VARIABLE LABELS
YOS 'YEARS OF SERVICE'
MSTATUS 'MARITAL STATUS'
ADAPTBLT 'ADAPTABILITY TO THE MILITARY LIFE'
CARSAT 'SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER'
COINCIDE 'PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS COINCIDANCE WITH MILITARY JOB*
PAYLEVEL 'SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY PAY'
OVERWORK 'DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENTED WORK HOURS'
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READINES 'LEVEL OF COMBAT READINESS'
QUARTERS 'SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY QUARTERS'
MILCLOTH 'SATISFACTION WITH PURCHASING CONDITION OF MILITARY CLOTHES*
RELIABLT 'CITIZEN TRUST IN THE MILITARY'
DAYDUTY 'FREQUENCY OF DAY DUTY TIMES'
REWARDS 'SATISFACTION WITH REWARDS'
RETIRJOB 'CONCERN ABOUT THE JOB AFTER RETIREMENT'
NATNSECU 'CONCERN ABOUT NATIONAL SECURITY'
MCRELATN 'RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY JOB AND CIVILIAN JOB'
PAYSATIS 'SATISFACTION WITH PAY COMPARED WITH THE CIVILIAN'
MILSAT 'SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE'
EVALUATN 'SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMNACE EVALUATIONS'
PXUTLZTN 'DISSATISFACTION WITH UTILIZATION OF PX SYSTEM'
COMNATTD 'DISSATISFACTION WITH COMMANDER ATTITUDE'
RECREATN 'SATISFACTION WITH SPORTS AND RECREATION FACILITIES'
DEBTPROB 'DEBT PROBLEMS'
PROMOTN 'SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION'
FRNGBNFT 'SATISFACTION WITH FRINGE BENEFITS'
EXTENDWH 'DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENTED WORK HOURS'
MEDICAL 'DISSATISFACTION WITH MEDICAL CARE'
SELECTN 'SATISFACTION WITH SELECTION FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION'
ENVIRMT 'SATISFACTION WITH RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENTS'
RETIRMNT 'DISSATISFACTION WITH CONDITIONS OF RETIREMENT REQUIREMENTS'
LEAVE 'SATISFACTION WITH REGULAR LEAVE'
VALUE LABELS
PAYGRADE 'l' '2ND LT'
'2'
'1ST LT'
'3'
'CAPTAIN'
'4'
'MAJOR'
'5'
'LT COLONEL'
'6'
'COLONEL'
/BRANCH ' 1' 'INFANTRY'
'2'
'ARTILLERY'
"
3
'
' ARMOR
'
'4'
'ENGINEER'
'5'
'COMMUNICATION'
'
6
' OTHERS
'
/MSTATUS '1' 'SINGLE'
'2'
'MARRIED'
'
3
' ' OTHERS
'
/ADAPTBLT COINCIDE READINES RELIABLT DAYDUTY RETIRJOB
NATNSECU MCRELATN DEBTPROB
'1'
'VERY HIGH'
'2'
'HIGH'
'3'
'NORMAL'
'4*
'LOW'
'5'
'VERY LOW'
/CARSAT PAYLEVEL QUARTERS MILCLOTH REWARDS PAYSATIS MILSAT EVALUATN
RECREATN PROMOTN FRNGBNFT SELECTN ENVIRMT LEAVE
'1'
'VERY SATISFIED'
'2'
'SATISFIED'
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'3'
'NORMAL'
'4'
'DISSATISFIED'
'5'
'VERY DISSATISFIED'
/OVERWORK PXUTLZTN COMNATTD EXTENDWH MEDICAL RETIRMNT
'l' 'VERY DISSATISFIED'
'2'
'DISSATISFIED'
'3'
'NORMAL'
'4'
'SATISFIED'
'5'
'VERY SATISFIED'
ADD VALUE LABELS
AGE '0' 'NO RESPONSE'
/YOS '0' 'NO RESPONSE'
/BRANCH '0' 'NO RESPONSE'
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=ALL/
FORMAT=DOUBLE/
CROSSTABS PAYGRADE BY MILSAT
CROSSTABS MILSAT BY PAYSATIS
CROSSTABS MILSAT BY READINES
SAVE OUTFILE =TEST
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APPENDIX E. STATISTICS DATA OF SURVEY RESULTS
Q 1. PAYGRADE
VALUE LABEL
VALID CUM
VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
2ND LT
1ST LT
CAPTAIN
MAJOR
LT COLONEL
COLONEL
1 87 10. 1 10. 1 10. 1
2 151 17.5 17.5 27.6
3 347 40.3 40. 3 67. 9
4 176 20.4 20.4 88. 3
5 83 9.6 9.6 97.9
6 18 2. 1 2. 1 100.0
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 2. BRANCH
VALUE LABEL
INFANTRY
ARTILLERY
ARMOR
ENGINEER
COMMUNICATION
OTHERS
VALID CUM
E FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 557 64.6 64.6 64.6
2 135 15. 7 15.7 80. 3
3 6 . 7 . 7 81.0
4 65 7.5 7.5 88.5
5 55 6.4 6.4 94. 9
6 44 5. 1 5. 1 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
Q 3. AGE
VALUE LABEL
VALID CUM
UE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
24 54 6. 3 6.3 6. 3
25 68 7.9 7. 9 14.2
26 104 12. 1 12. 1 26.2
27 44 5. 1 5. 1 31.3
28 102 11.8 11.8 43.2
29 114 13.2 13.2 56.4
30 49 5. 7 5.7 62. 1
31 60 7.0 7.0 69.
32 95 11.0 11.0 80.0
33 29 3.4 3.4 83.4
34 30 3.5 3.5 86.9
35 12 1.4 1.4 88. 3
36 11 1.3 1.3 89.6
37 24 2.8 2.8 92. 3
38 10 1.2 1.2 93.5
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Q4. YEARS OF SERVICE
Q5. MARITAL STATUS
39 8 . 9 . 9 94.4
40 11 1. 3 1. 3 95. 7
41 4 .5 .5 96.2
42 7
. 8 . 8 97.
43 8 . 9 . 9 97. 9
45 5 . 6 . 6 98.5
46 5 . 6 . 6 99. 1
47 4 .5 .5 99. 5
48 3 . 3 . 3 99. 9
50 1 . 1 . 1 100.
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
VALUE LABEL
VAL][D CUM
,UE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 54 6. 3 6. 3 6. 3
2 102 11. 8 11. 8 18. 1
3 82 9.5 9. 5 27. 6
4 85 9.9 9. 9 37.5
5 112 13. 13. 50.5
6 84 9. 7 9. 7 60.2
7 60 7. 7. 67. 2
8 96 11. 1 11. 1 78. 3
9 42 4.9 4. 9 83. 2
10 21 2.4 2. 4 85. 6
11 9 1. 1. 86. 7
12 15 1. 7 1. / 88.4
13 17 2.0 2. 90.4
14 26 3.0 3. 93.4
15 10 1.2 1. 2 94.5
16 10 1. 2 1. 2 95. 7
17 12 1.4 1. 4 97. 1
18 5 . 6 6 97. 7
19 4 . 5 5 98. 1
20 7 .8 8 99.
21 4 . 5 5 99. 4
22 3 . 3 3 99. 8
23 2 . 2 100.
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
VALUE LABEL
VALID CUM
VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
SINGLE
MARRIED
296
566
34. 3
65. 7
34. 3
65. 7
34. 3
100.
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
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Q 6. ADAPTABILITY TO MILITARY LIFE
VALUE LABEL
VERY HIGH
HIGH
NORMAL
LOW
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 192 22. 3 22. 3 22. 3
2 286 33. 2 33. 2 55.5
3 312 36. 2 36.2 91. 6
4 72 8.4 8.4 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.
Q 7. SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALID CUM
VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 243 28.2 28.2 28.2
2 242 28. 1 28. 1 56.3
3 281 32.6 32.6 88. 9
4 75 8. 7 8. 7 97.6
5 21 2.4 2.4 100.0
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 8. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS COINCIDANCE WITH
MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS
VALUE LABEL
VERY HIGH
HIGH
NORMAL
LOW
VERY LOW
VALID CUM
VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 172 20.0 20.0 20.
2 187 21. 7 21. 7 41.6
3 380 44. 1 44. 1 85. 7
4 73 8.5 8.5 94. 2
5 50 5.8 5.8 100.
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 9. SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY PAY
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
'E FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 6 . 7 . 7 . 7
2 79 9.2 9.2 9.9
3 183 21.2 21.2 31. 1
4 435 50.5 50.5 81.6
5 159 18.4 18.4 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
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Q 10. DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENTED WORK HOURS
VALUE LABEL
VERY DISSATISFIED
DISSATISFIED
NORMAL
SATISFIED
VERY SATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
IE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 80 9. 3 9. 3 9. 3
2 263 30.5 30. 5 39. 8
3 362 42. 42.0 81. 8
4 141 16.4 16.4 98. 1
5 16 1. 9 1.9 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.
Q 11. READINES ESTIMATES OF COMBAT READINESS
VALUE LABEL
VERY HIGH
HIGH
NORMAL
LOW
VERY LOW
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 114 13.2 13. 2 13. 2
2 387 44. 9 44. 9 58. 1
3 265 30. 7 30. 7 88. 9
4 79 9.2 9.2 98.0
5 17 2.0 2.0 100.0
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 12. SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY QUARTERS
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 42 4.9 4.9 4.9
2 98 11.4 11.4 16.2
3 275 31. 9 31. 9 48. 1
4 343 39.8 39.8 87. 9
5 104 12. 1 12. 1 100.
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 13. SATISFACTION WITH PURCHASING CONDITION
OF MILITARY CLOTHES
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 36 4.2 4.2 4.2
2 54 6.3 6. 3 10.4
3 213 24. 7 24. 7 35.2
4 383 44.4 44.4 79.6
5 176 20.4 20.4 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
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Q 14. CITIZENS' TRUST TO THE MILITARY
VALUE LABEL
VERY HIGH
HIGH
NORMAL
LOW
VERY LOW
VALID CUM
VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 85 9.9 9.9 9.9
2 206 23.9 23. 9 33.8
3 346 40. 1 40. 1 73.9
4 203 23.5 23.5 97.4
5 22 2.6 2.6 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
Q 15. FREQUENCY OF DAY DUTY TIMES
VALUE LABEL
VERY HIGH
HIGH
NORMAL
LOW
VERY LOW
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 249 28.9 28.9 28.9
2 322 37.4 37.4 66. 2
3 229 26.6 26.6 92.8
4 47 5. 5 5.5 98.3
5 15 1. 7 1. 7 100.
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.
Q 16. SATISFACTION WITH REWARDS
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 123 14. 3 14.3 14.3
2 257 29.8 29. 8 44. 1
3 295 34. 2 34.2 78. 3
4 160 18.6 18. 6 96. 9
5 27 3. 1 3. 1 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.
Q 17. CONCERN ABOUT THE JOB AFTER RETIREMENT
VALUE LABEL
VERY HIGH
HIGH
NORMAL
LOW
VERY LOW
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 235 27.3 27. 3 27. 3
2 165 19. 1 19. 1 46.4
3 229 26.6 26.6 73.
4 146 16.9 16.9 89. 9
5 87 10. 1 10. 1 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
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Q 18. CONCERN ABOUT NATIONAL SECURITY
VALUE LABEL
VERY HIGH
HIGH
NORMAL
LOW
VALID
VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT
1
2
3
4
TOTAL
585
173
75
29
67. 9
20. 1
8. 7
3.4
67. 9
20. 1
8. 7
3.4
CUM
PERCENT
67. 9
87. 9
96.6
100.0
862 100. 100.0
Q 19. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY JOB AND CIVILIANS'
VALUE LABEL
VERY HIGH
HIGH
NORMAL
LOW
VERY LOW
VALID CUM
E FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 204 23. 7 23. 7 23. 7
2 243 28. 2 28. 2 51.9
3 248 28. 8 28. 8 80. 6
4 103 11.9 11. 9 92.6
5 64 7.4 7.4 100.0
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 20. SATISFACTION WITH PAY COMPARED WITH THE CIVILIAN SECTORS
VALUE LABEL
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALID CUM
VALUE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
2 79 9.2 9.2 9. 2
3 240 27. 8 27.8 37.
4 395 45. 8 45. 8 82. 8
5 148 17.2 17. 2 100.
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 21. SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 81 9.4 9.4 9.4
2 180 20. 9 20. 9 30. 3
3 375 43.5 43.5 73. 8
4 212 24.6 24.6 98.4
5 14 1.6 1.6 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
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Q 22. SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMNACE EVALUATION
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
IE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 131 15.2 15.2 15. 2
2 228 26.5 26.5 41.6
3 342 39. 7 39. 7 81. 3
4 141 16.4 16.4 97. 7
5 20 2.3 2.3 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
Q 23. DISSATISFACTION WITH UTILIZATION OF PX SERVICE
VALUE LABEL
VERY DISSATISFIED
DISSATISFIED
NORMAL
SATISFIED
VERY SATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 247 28. 7 28. 7 28. 7
2 344 39.9 39. 9 68.6
3 184 21. 3 21. 3 89. 9
4 51 5.9 5.9 95. 8
5 36 4. 2 4. 2 100.
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 24. DISSATISFACTION WITH COMMANDING ATTITUDE
VALUE LABEL
VERY DISSATISFIED
DISSATISFIED
NORMAL
SATISFIED
VERY SATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 100 11.6 11.6 11.6
2 329 38.2 38.2 49.8
3 227 26. 3 26. 3 76. 1
4 179 20.8 20.8 96.9
5 27 3. 1 3. 1 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
Q 25. SATISFACTION WITH SPORTS AND RECREATION FACILITIES
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
IE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 63 7.3 7.3 7.3
2 80 9.3 9.3 16.6
3 238 27.6 27.6 44.2
4 397 46. 1 46. 1 90.3
5 84 9. 7 9.7 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
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Q 26. DEBT PROBLEMS
VALUE LABEL
VERY HIGH
HIGH
NORMAL
LOW
VERY LOW
VALID CUM
IE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 12 1.4 1.4 1.4
2 164 19. 19. 20. 4
3 287 33. 3 33. 3 53. 7
4 249 28. 9 28. 9 82. 6
5 150 17.4 17.4 100.
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 27. SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 34 3. 9 3. 9 3.9
2 99 11. 5 11.5 15.4
3 303 35. 2 35.2 50. 6
4 299 34. 7 34. 7 85. 3
5 127 14.7 14. 7 100.
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 28. SATISFACTION WITH FRINGE BENEFITS
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
IE FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 63 7. 3 7. 3 7. 3
2 138 16. 16. 23. 3
3 325 37. 7 37. 7 61.
4 253 29.4 29.4 90.4
5 83 9. 6 9.6 100.0
TOTAL 862 100. 100.
Q 29. DISSATISFACTION WITH EXTENTED WORK HOURS
VALUE LABEL
VERY DISSATISFIED
DISSATISFIED
NORMAL
SATISFIED
VERY SATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 353 41. 41.0 41.
2 370 42.9 42. 9 83. 9
3 103 11.9 11. 9 95. 8
4 18 2. 1 2. 1 97. 9
5 18 2. 1 2. 1 100.
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.
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Q 30. DISSATISFACTION WITH MEDICAL CARE
VALUE LABEL
VERY DISSATISFIED
DISSATISFIED
NORMAL
SATISFIED
VERY SATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 71 8.2 8.2 8.2
2 434 50. 3 50. 3 58.6
3 227 26.3 26. 3 84. 9
4 76 8.8 8.8 93. 7
5 54 6.3 6.3 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
Q 31. SATISFACTION WITH SELECTION FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 63 7.3 7.3 7. 3
2 172 20. 20.0 27. 3
3 523 60. 7 60. 7 87.9
4 104 12. 1 12. 1 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
Q 32. SATISFACTION WITH RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENT FACTORS
VALUE LABEL
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 36 4.2 4.2 4.2
2 79 9.2 9.2 13. 3
3 264 30. 6 30.6 44.0
4 334 38. 7 38. 7 82. 7
5 149 17. 3 17.3 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.
Q 33. DISSATISFACTION WITH CONDITIONS OF RETIREMENT
VALUE LABEL
VERY DISSATISFIED
DISSATISFIED
NORMAL
SATISFIED
VERY SATISFIED
VALUE
VALID CUM
FREQUENCY PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
1 147 17. 1 17. 1 17. 1
2 247 28. 7 28. 7 45. 7
3 366 42.5 42.5 88. 2
4 98 11.4 11.4 99.5
5 4 .5 .5 100.0
TOTAL 862 100.0 100.0
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SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE
MARITAL STATUS
BY MARITAL STATUS
COUNT
ISINGLE
11
MARRIED
12 I
-+
-+
-+
-+
-+
ROW
TOTAL
1
VERY SATISFIED
+-•
10 I
I
-+-
I
I
71 81
9.4
2
SATISFIED
83 97 180
20.9
3
NORMAL
88 I
I
287 375
43.5
4
DISSATISFIED
101 I
I
111 212
24.6
5
VERY DISSATISFIE
+-
14 I
I
14
1.6
COLUMN
TOTAL
296
34.3
566
65. 7
862
100.0
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY BRANCH
BRANCH
COUNT I
I INFAN ARTI ARMOR ENGIN COMMUNI OTHERS ROW
I TRY LLERY EER CATION TOTAL
II 12 13 14 15 16 I
SATISFACTION ---+ + + + + + +
1 I 70 I 8 I 3 I I I I 81
VERY SATISFY I I I I I I I 9.
4
+ + + + + + +
2 I 136 I 21 I II I 11 I 11 I 180
SATISFIED I I I I I I I 20. 9
+ + + + + + +
3 I 205 I 61 I I 65 I 33 I 11 I 375
NORMAL I I I I I I I 43.5
+ + + + + + +
4 I 137 I 40 I 2 1 I 11 I 22 I 212
DISSATISFY I I I I I I I 24. 6
+ + + + --+ + +
5 I 91 51 01 01 01 01 14
VERY DISSATISFYI I I I I I 11.6
COLUMN 557 135 6 65 55 44 862
TOTAL 64.6 15.7 .7 7.5 6.4 5.1 100.0
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SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH PAY COMPARED
WITH THE CIVILIANS
PAY SATISFACTION
COUNT I
T CAT _______
ISA
ID
12
I
I
+--
I
I
+--
I
I
+--
I
I
+--
I
I
+--
TISFIE N(
13
24 I
I
+_.
19 I
I
+--
28 I
I
+-•
8 I
I
+-
I
I
79
9. 2
DRMAL DISSAT]
FIED
14
I 25
-+
I 85
I 167
-+
I 118
I
-+
395
45.8
S VERY DIS
SATISFIE
15 I
I 20 I
I I
-+ +
I 19 I
I I
-+ +
I 47 I
I I
-+ +
I 48 I
I I
_4-_ r -L
ROW
TOTAL
LiOHl --
1
VERY SATISFIED
2
SATISFIED
12
57
81
9.4
180
20.9
3
NORMAL
4
DISSATISFIED
133
38
375
43.5
212
24.6
5
VERY DISSATISFIE
-)- •"
"+-
r
14 I
I
+
148
17.2
14
1.6
COLUMN
TOTAL
240
27.8
862
100.
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY PAY
PAY LEVEL SATISFACTION
COUNT I
T 9AT
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL
IISFIED D
11 12 13
I 1 11 I 26II
I 1 16 I 46
I I I
I 6 I 52 I 87
I I I
+ + +
I 1 I 24II
I 1 1
I I I
6 79 183
.7 9.2 21.2
DISSATIS VERY DIS
FIED SATISFIE
14 15 I
I 33 I 11 I
I I I
I 100 I 18 III
-+ + +
I 169 I 61 I
I I I
-+ + +
I 132 I 56 III
I 11 13 III
-+ + +
435 159
50.5 18.4
ROW
TOTAL
jbOrtl _______
1
VERY SATISFIED
81
9.4
2
SATISFIED
180
20.9
3
NORMAL
4
DISSATISFIED
375
43.5
212
24.6
5
VERY DISSATISFIE
. 14
1.6
COLUMN
TOTAL
862
100.0
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SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH FRINGE BENEFITS
SATISFACTION WITH FRINGE BENEFITS
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
II 12 13 14 15 I
MILSAT + + + + + +
1 I 3 I 10 I 37 I 15 I 16 I 81
VERY SATISFIED I I I I I I 9.
4
+ + + + + +
2 I 30 I 19 I 98 I 32 I 1 I 180
SATISFIED I I I I I I 20.
9
+ -+ + + + +
3 I 25 I 75 I 101 I 127 I 47 I 375
NORMAL I I I I I I 43.5
+ + + + + +
4 I 3 I 34 I 89 I 71 I 15 I 212
DISSATISFIED I I I I I I 24.
6
5 I 21 01 01 81 41 14
VERY DISSATISFIE I I I I I 11.6
COLUMN 63 138 325 253 83 862
TOTAL 7.3 16.0 37.7 29.4 9.6 100.0
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY QUARTERS
QUARTERS
MILSAT
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL
IISFIED D
II 12 13
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
DISSATIS VERY DIS
FIED SATISFIE
14 15
I
I
+ --•
I
I
+ --•
I
I
+ --•
I
I
+ --•
I
VERY DISSATISFIE I
+
COLUMN
TOTAL
11 35 21
42
4.9
55
I 14 III
12 I 54 I 42 I
I I I
19 I 30 I 124 I 141
I I I
1 1 74 I 126
I I I
+ + +
1 1 1III
+ + +
I
I
I 17
I
I 61
I
I 12
I
+
I 14
I
•+ •
98
11.4
275
31.9
343
39.8
104
12. 1
ROW
TOTAL
81
9.4
180
20. 9
375
43.5
212
24. 6
14
1. 6
862
100.
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SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY JOB CONCERNS AFTER RETIREMENT
JOB CONCERNS
MILSAT
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
COUNT I
IVERY HIG HIGH
IH
II 12
I 28 I 26
I I
I 40 I 17
I I
I 126 I 42
I I
+- +
I 41 I 66
I I
5 I I 14
VERY DISSATISFIE I I
COLUMN 235 165
TOTAL 27.3 19.1
NORMAL LOW VERY LOW ROW
TOTAL
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
13
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
12
66
96
55
14
-+-
I
I
• -+-
I
I
-+
I 56
I
•-+
15
36
I
I
I
I
229
26.6
15 I
+ +
I 81
I 9.4
21 I 180
I 20.9
55 I 375
I 43.5
+ +
39 I 11 I 212
I 24.6
+ +
1 1 14
I 1.6
146 87 862
100.016.9 10. 1
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTION
PROMOTION
MILSAT
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL
IISFIED D
II 12 13
DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
14 15 I
1
VERY SATISFIED
I
I
+--
I
I
+--
I
I
+--
I
I
+--
I
I
2
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i—
ii—
I
+
I—
ii—
i
+
i—
it—
(
+
i—
ll—
l
+
t—
ii—
IH
i
i
i
i
l
11 I 10
I 89
I 68
I 122
I 14
I 33 I 25
I I
I 45 I 18
I I
I 148 I 83
I I
I 73 I 1
I I
I 1
I I
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
81
9.4
2
SATISFIED
3 25 180
20. 9
3
NORMAL
28 48 375
43.5
4
DISSATISFIED
1 15 212
24.6
5
VERY BISSl^TISFIE
COLUMN
14
1.6
34 99 303 299 127 862
TOTAL 3.9 11.5 35.2 34. 7 14. 7 100.0
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SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH REGULAR LEAVE
LEAVE
COUNT
MILSAT
SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
2 13 14 15 I
1 I 34 19 I 28 I 81
VERY SATISFIED I I I 9.4
2 19 I 11 62 I 88 I 180
SATISFIED I I I 20.9
3
NORMAL
+-•
8 I
I
-+-
64
-+-
75 I
I
-+-
228 I
I
-+
375
43.5
4 11 I 7 109 I 85 I 212
DISSATISFIED
+-•
I
-+-
I
-+-
I
-+-
I
I
-+
I
24. 6
5 14 14
VERY DISSATISFIE
+-
I
-+- -+-
I
-+-
I
-+
1.6
COLUMN 38 116 265 443 862
TOTAL 4.4 13.5 30. 7 51.4 100.0
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY CAREER
COUNT
VERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
ISFIED D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
1 12 13 14 15 I
+ + --+ + +MILSAT
1
VERY SATISFIED
2
SATISFIED
3
NORMAL
4
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIE
COLUMN
TOTAL
67
68 I 72
I
81 I 75
I
+
27 I 90
I
+
1
I
+
243 242
28. 2 28. 1
33 I 7
I
170 I 32
I
+
66 I 26
I
+
12 I 1
I
+
281 75
32.6 8.7
81
9.4
180
20. 9
I
I
I
I
17 I 375
I 43.5
+
212
24.6
14
1.6
862
100.0
3 I
I
+
1 I
I
+
21
2.4
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SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY DISSATISFACTION WITH
EXTENTED WORK HOURS
COUNT I
MILSAT
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
IVERY DIS DISSATIS NORMAL
ISATISFIE FIED
II 12 13
SATISFIE VERY SAT
D ISFIED
14 15
ROW
TOTAL
VERY DISSATISFIE
COLUMN
TOTAL
I
I
+
I
I
+
I
I
+
I
I
+
I
I
+
21 I
I
+..
5 I
I
+_.
I
I
+-•
I
I
I
I
+-•
80
9.3
75
33
21
130
•--+
56
,__+
42
94
263
30.5
I
I
+
I
I
•+
I
I
+•
I
I
11 I
I
+
362
42.0
16
111
104
85
31
__+__.
16
.+
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
-+
I
I
+
• -+
I
I
+
141
16.4
16
1.9
81
9.4
180
20.9
375
43.5
212
24.6
14
1.6
862
100.
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY ESTIMATES OF COMBAT READINESS
COMBAT READINESS
COUNT I
IVERY HIG HIGH NORMAL LOW VERY LOW ROW
IH TOTAL
11 12 13 14 15 I
LSAT -+-- +-- -+-- _+ _+ +
1 I 10 I 34 22 I 15 I 81
VERY SATISFIED I
+--
I
I
36 I
-+--
I
.+
I
_+
I
+
I
9.4
2 102 40 2 180
SATISFIED I I I I 20. 9
+-- +-- -+-- .+ .+ +
3 I 37 I 178 133 I 27 I 375
NORMAL I
+--
I
I
31 I
-+--
I
-+
I
_+
I
+
I
43.5
4 73 70 38 212
DISSATISFIED I I I I 24.6
+-- +-- -+-- .+ _+ +
5 I I I 12 2 I 14
VERY DISSATISFIE I I I I 1.6
+-- 1
—
-+-- _+ _+ (.
COLUMN
TOTAL
114
13.2
387
44.9
265
30. 7
79
9.2
17
2.0
862
100.0
80
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH REWARDS
REWARDS
COUNT I
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
II 12 13 14 15 I
MILSAT + + + + + +
1 I 91 37 I 01 91 26 I 81
VERY SATISFIED I I I I I I 9.4
+ + + + + +
2 I 28 I 52 I 68 I 32 I I 180
SATISFIED I I I I I I 20. 9
+ + + + + +
3 I 86 I 83 I 148 I 57 I II 375
NORMAL I I I I I I 43.5
+ + + + + +
4 I I 85 I 79 I 48 I I 212
DISSATISFIED I I I I I I 24. 6
5 I 01 01 01 14 I 01 14
VERY DISSATISFIE I I I I I I 1.6
+ + + + + +
COLUMN 123 257 295 160 27 862
TOTAL 14.3 29.8 34.2 18.6 3.1 100.0
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH
PERFORMNACE EVALUATION
COUNT I
II
+-
I
I
+ -
I
I
+-
I
I
+-
I
I
+-
5 I
VERY DISSATISFIE I
+-
COLUMN
TOTAL
MILSAT
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL
IISFIED D
13
22 I
I
57 I
DISSATIS VERY DIS ROW
FIED SATISFIE TOTAL
12
32 I
I
24 I
I
69 I • 69
I
12
67
i I
I
I I
I
80
I
-+-
I
I
+-
I
I
•+-
I
I
+-
131
15.2
228
26.5
14
+ --
I
I
+--
I
I
189 I
I
62 I
I
12 I
I
342
39. 7
15
5 I
I
10
32
38
64
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
-+
I
I
I
I
10 I
I
I
I
+
I
I
-+
141
16.4
20
2.3
81
9.4
180
20. 9
375
43.5
212
24.6
14
1.6
862
100.
81
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY SATISFACTION WITH
SELECTION FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION
SELECTION
COUNT
MILSAT
VERY SATISFIED
SATISFIED
NORMAL
DISSATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIE
COLUMN
TOTAL
IVERY SAT SATISFIE NORMAL DISSATIS ROW
IISFIED D FIED TOTAL
11 12 13
I 31 I 15 I 34
14 I
I 11 81II
I 7 I 65 I 87
I I
I 21 I
9.4
180
I I I
I 21 I 72 I 247
I I
I 35 I
20.9
375
I I I
I 4 1 16 I 155
I I
I 37 I
43.5
212II
I 1 4 1
I I
I 10 I
24.6
14
I I I
63 172 523
I I
104
1.6
862
7.3 20.0 60.7 12. 1 100.0
SATISFACTION WITH MILITARY LIFE BY DISSATISFACTION WITH
CONDITIONS OF RETIRMENTS
RETIREMENT CONDITIONS
COUNT I
IVERY DIS DISSATIS NORMAL SATISFIE VERY SAT ROW
ISATISFIE FIED D ISFIED TOTAL
T <5 AT _______
11
-+-
I
12 13
-+-
14
I
15 I
-+
I
JjOfii
1 15 14 22 30 81
VERY SATISFIED I I I 9.4
2 I 3 62 88 I 25 2 I 180
SATISFIED I
+- -+-
I
_+
I 20.9
3 I 85 88 175 I 26 1 I 375
NORMAL I
-+-
I I 43.5
4 I 44 69 81 I 17 1 I 212
DISSATISFIED I
+- -+- _+_.
I
_+
I
-+
24.6
5 I 14 I I 14
VERY DISSATISFIE I I I 1.6
COLUMN 147 247 366 98 4 862
TOTAL 17. 1 28. 7 42.5 11.4 5 100.
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